Compiled by leaders of groups from communities located in the shadows of U.S. nuclear weapons sites. The report card grades looks to the future and lays out an agenda for the next administration.
2008 Radioactive Report Card Grade Book
Press Release
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| | | published Wednesday, January 06, 2010 | 762 Views | |  |
Wall Street Journal Article Makes Ill Advised Recommendations on the Future of Nuclear Weapons
Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed supporting recommendations made in a letter sent to the President by 40 Republican Senators and Senator Joe Lieberman. The op-ed supports construction of new facilities and new warheads. The following is ANA’s analysis of the letter:
The letter is incorrect in stating that the 2010 Defense Authorization Bill calls for a plan to modernize the nuclear deterrent. The Defense Authorization Bill actually calls for a plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, not the nuclear deterrent.
As currently proposed, recommendations to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and stockpile undermine nonproliferation efforts. The letter calls for a modern pit facility and replacement of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility (CMR). The modern pit facility was a project that faced bipartisan opposition in Congress and was ultimately cancelled by the Bush administration in 2004. As currently proposed, these facilities would significantly increase U.S. warhead production capability. If the United States expands its warhead production capacity during a time when it is supposed to be recommitting to its international obligation to work towards eliminating nuclear weapons, it will make it difficult or impossible to achieve U.S. non-proliferation objectives. This includes achieving universal adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol and making it the verification standard of the NPT; strengthening the NPT to deal with violators that withdraw from the treaty; enhancing the enforcement of non-proliferation commitments under the NPT; and gaining support for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
Current proposals for modernized nuclear warheads and production facilities that support “replacement” are expensive. The Government Accountability Office estimated that new warhead production facilities producing newly designed warheads would cost at least $150 billion. National Nuclear Security Administration’s cost estimate for constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility has more than doubled from $838 million to over $2 billion since 2006. The price tag for the Uranium Processing Facility at Y12 has been estimated at $3.5 billion.
Modernization takes focus away from investments in nuclear weapons complex expertise that actually do need to be made.
- Verification: The national nuclear laboratories can uniquely develop technologies that will contribute to detecting nuclear tests around the world and facilitate verification of nuclear weapons reductions under arms control treaties with Russia.
- Safeguards: The national laboratories can improve technologies to detect diversion for military purposes of nuclear power technology or materials in countries without nuclear weapons.
- Dismantlement: The Labs can increase the rate of dismantlement (process by which nuclear warheads are removed from the stockpile, disassembled, and disposed of) to support permanent reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
- Threat reduction at the source: Consolidation, reduction and elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapon and nuclear weapons-usable materials where these materials are produced and stored worldwide. Increasing funding for these efforts advances U.S. ability to reduce and lock down vulnerable nuclear materials and reduces the risk of nuclear terrorism.
The letter is incorrect in summarizing the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. The strategic Posture Commission does not assert any connection between modernization and the nuclear force reductions. However, the Commission report strongly supports further reductions in the nuclear stockpile. For more on this, see http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/1/6/10385/96547.
The nuclear deterrent is certified as reliable. More is known today about the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal than ever before and confidence in the ability to maintain the warheads is increasing at a faster rate than the uncertainties. A recent study by the eminent groups of scientists, the JASONs, found “no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs [existing Life Extension Programs] have increased risk to certification of today’s deployed nuclear warheads.”
Support for a new Life Extension Program with a “replacement” option jeopardizes the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. According to the recent JASON report, “Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to date.” There is no need to add new capabilities to the nuclear weapons complex or introduce new techniques in order to maintain the nuclear stockpile. In fact, there are significant concerns that modified approach to Life Extension Programs could diminish the reliability of the stockpile.
Funding for the B61 Life Extension Program is premature. It is premature to provide funding for this program before the U.S. completes its Nuclear Posture Review and European allies complete their NATO Strategic concept, which will both impact the future deployment of the B61. The Obama Administration has indicated that it might consider removing these warheads from Europe as a way to encourage Russia to consolidate its own arsenal of nonstrategic bombs. NATO countries, such as Germany, have also expressed interest in removing all 200 B61 warheads deployed in Germany.
Increased safety and security of the stockpile can be achieved simply through reducing the stockpiles of Russia and the United States. Together the United States and Russia possess some 20,000 nuclear weapons, about 95 percent of all these in the world. Designed for the Cold War, such massive arsenals are useless against current threats like terrorism. U.S. and Russian reductions would reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch or theft of weapons or materials for use in nuclear terrorism. The appropriate mission for U.S. nuclear weapons is deterrence. Reducing the current U.S. nuclear stockpile will not undermine or endanger this mission.
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