

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Policies and Procedures
[Final Approved May 1998]

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I - 1.

A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR PEOPLE IN THE SHADOWS OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

by the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Preamble:

Over the past five decades the U.S. government has built and operated a nationwide complex of facilities for the production and testing of nuclear weapons as well as for the disposition of their radioactive and chemical wastes.. The U.S. public is becoming increasingly aware of the damage to public health and the environment resulting from these operations. Government agencies have consistently withheld information from citizens about radioactive releases whether planned, routine or accidental. Wastes have been and continue to be cast aside, resulting in contamination of the land, air and water. Minimal progress has been made on clean-up, storage, and disposal efforts. To date, the evidence is compelling that the damage caused represents a profound breach of trust with the people of the United States.

As citizens who live in the shadows of nuclear weapons production plants and related facilities, we have a legitimate interest in the recognition and observance of our fundamental rights to public safety, environmental quality, government accountability, and due process. Major reforms are required. The perpetuation of secrecy and self-regulation in the nuclear weapons production system is not tolerable in a free society. Without substantial changes in current laws and practices the people of the United States have little guarantee that the continued operation of nuclear weapons production facilities is in their best interest, or that public safety and the environment are being adequately protected.

Together We Find:

- a) The extent of environmental damage at current nuclear weapons materials production sites will likely cost over \$250 billion to clean up. Unless remedial action is taken in a timely fashion, the vast quantities of radioactive and hazardous chemical wastes accumulated pose an unacceptable risk to present and future generations.
- b) Successive Administrations have failed to substantiate a need for continued production of nuclear weapons materials. Congress has been negligent in its Constitutional responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons materials production activities are warranted.
- c) The authority given the U.S. Department of Energy under the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 to control all substantive information related to special nuclear materials production is so broad as to make accountability impossible. The public is entitled to all the information necessary to weigh the rationale offered for continuing

nuclear weapons materials production. Congress must forcefully acknowledge and work to protect citizens' rights to participate in the decision-making process.

- d) Economic dependence of communities which host nuclear weapons research, testing, production and waste disposal facilities has a corrosive and unacceptable effect on public policy at all levels. We reject nuclear weapons production as a tool for local economic development and call on Congress to reject appeals for continued nuclear materials research, testing and production that are based on economic considerations.
- e) National efforts to locate geological repositories for the ultimate disposal of high-level nuclear and transuranic wastes have been repeatedly compromised for political purposes. No objective process yet exists to guarantee the safe disposal of these wastes while, at the same time, respecting the due process rights of citizens.
- f) The U.S. Department of Energy and its predecessors have historically rejected commercial nuclear industry safety requirements and environmental protection regulations at weapons production facilities. This behavior is a direct consequence of the agency's singular emphasis on nuclear weapons production, as well as the provisions in federal law that exempt the agency's activities from many state and federal environmental laws.
- g) Past releases of radioactive and toxic materials from these facilities and from nuclear testing have been extensive. The federal government has an obligation to fund independent assessments of the extent of harm to public health from these releases.
- h) Self-regulation by the Department of Energy is a major contributor to safety and environmental problems at the production sites. State and federal agencies independent of the Department of Energy should be commissioned to monitor and regulate safety and environmental compliance. Congress must work to ensure that adequate federal funds are provided to state and federal agencies commissioned for this role.

Based on these findings, we believe that the people of the United States are entitled to the following rights:

- 1) Clear public proof that present and future nuclear weapons materials research, testing and production activities are essential to national security.
- 2) Independent licensing, regulation, and enforcement of safety at nuclear weapons material production and waste sites.
- 3) Mandatory citizen standing and participation in the licensing of proposed new research, testing, production and waste sites and the structuring of environmental protection and monitoring programs.

- 4) Full compliance with federal and state environmental laws at all nuclear weapons materials research, testing, production, handling and waste sites.
- 5) A process for the interim stabilization and isolation of high-level nuclear and transuranic wastes at the point of origin that maximizes worker, public, and environmental protection. The ultimate disposal of these wastes should be pursued in a manner that assures scientific credibility, protects the public health and safety, and guarantees the rights of states, local governments, and private citizens.
- 6) A binding commitment from the federal government to pay the full costs of waste disposal, decommissioning and decontamination associated with past and present nuclear weapons material production.
- 7) Implementation of long-term, independent health studies in communities where there have been radioactive and toxic releases from nuclear weapons production and testing.
- 8) A binding commitment from the federal government to provide retraining, job placement, and economic diversification programs in communities which are economically dependent on nuclear weapons production.
- 9) A fundamental standard of public policy which acknowledges that decisions to produce nuclear weapons materials not be influenced by local and regional economic pressures.

I - 2.

OPERATING PRINCIPLES

As a network that inherently affirms the concept of unity through diversity, the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability has adopted the following principles:

DIVERSITY

- In all our actions, we will respect the individual and cultural differences of our members as well as value the unique contribution of each culture to the world's history and future success of the ANA.
- We will treat people of color and other disenfranchised groups as equal partners including representation on all boards, sharing of resources and implementation of programs.
- We recognize that each member brings unique talents and perspectives to the organization and each member is empowered to define her/his own identity.
- We are committed to diversifying the organization by implementing strategies to increase and maintain the participation of people of color and other disenfranchised groups.
- We believe that there should be shared responsibility for enabling people of color and other disenfranchised groups to participate in ANA.
- We recognize that internalizing actions that strengthen diversity requires flexibility in institutional operations.

RELATIONSHIPS

- We will show respect for one another.
- We will listen to each other.
- We will avoid labeling individuals and groups.
- We will create an environment where all people have the opportunity to speak for themselves and be heard.
- We believe that everyone is responsible for establishing an environment where communication is easy, continuous, open, and certain.

COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

- We recognize the varied resources present in the ANA and we will exhibit a generosity of spirit when sharing our talent, expertise, and skills with member groups representing low income people and communities.
- We recognize that local groups carry the obligation and responsibility to provide leadership in addressing issues which affect their communities.
- We recognize that a central role of the ANA is to provide information which empowers local groups and enables them to fulfill this obligation.
- We also recognize that local groups carry a responsibility to the ANA to communicate their issues, activities and concerns.
- We will follow a structure to incorporate the input of local grassroots organizations on any aspect of a policy issue that affects the region in which the local group operates.
- We urge each member of the ANA to take ownership and exercise responsibility for seeing through those policy decisions that affect a region or issue in which the member is interested.
- We will prepare ourselves to be full participants in ANA meetings and activities.
- We will be clear about who we are representing when we speak and act.
- We will keep in mind that we are all struggling toward the same goals and we will respect each other's efforts in that struggle.

I - 3.

ANA MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (Amendment adopted 5/19/99) (Second Amendment January 2002)

ANA Member Rights and Responsibilities

1. Who can be a Member?:
 - Organizations that work on a particular facility or work on policy issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities.
 - Organizations that sign on to ANA's By-Laws and to ANA's Policies and Procedures, including Organizational Procedures and Position Statements.

2. What ANA provides/offers to Members*:
 - Communications and networking (electronic communications system, first priority to attend ANA meetings, news clips, updates from ANA staff)
 - Training Opportunities (DC Week, ANA Meetings, on-site)
 - Access to staff and ANA resource people (ANA staff, Media/Public Education consultant)
 - Organizational support (funding for one representative of Member grassroots groups to attend ANA meetings. National Member groups are not subsidized.)
 - Participation in joint statements (only ANA Members are listed on Tier 1 letterhead)
 - Voice in ANA decision making (one vote per member organization)
 - Members may serve on the ANA Board of Directors

- * **[NOTE:** Benefits provided to Members and Friends have a significant financial implication for the ANA, and so continuing the present benefits at their current level will depend on the financial situation of the ANA, as determined by the Board of Directors.]

3. Responsibilities of ANA Members:
 - Actively address issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities
 - Regularly attend ANA meetings and participate in ANA business between meetings
 - Be responsive to communications from fellow ANA Members including:
 - agree to read ANA mail and respond in a timely manner
 - agree to return phone calls
 - Participate in electronic communications system if at all possible
 - If using electronic communications system, agree to log on at least once/week.
 - Contribute something to ANA (i.e., a willingness to accept responsibility on committees and to follow through on all agreements)
 - Agree to the public use of your name on ANA brochure and other ANA public statements (as described in the ANA Public Profile Guidelines)
 - Be a responsible ANA meeting participant:
 - read materials in advance
 - respect group process

- accept facilitation
- participate, don't dominate (i.e., use self-discipline)
- Work in good faith with ANA to resolve differences and problems.
- Comply with ANA's Organizational Procedures (as described in Policies and Procedures)

ANA Friend Rights and Responsibilities

1. Who can be a Friend?:
 - Organizations that work on a particular facility or work on policy issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities.
 - Organizations that sign on to the ANA By-Laws and Policies and Procedures.
Friends are not required to sign on to the ANA Public Policy Position statements.

2. What ANA provides/offers to Friends:
 - Friends are invited to participate in ANA meetings, on ANA committees and task forces, and on the electronic communications system (without subsidy).
 - Friends have the option to sign on to Tier 2 and Tier 3 public statements.
 - Friends will be listed on the ANA brochure in a separate category from Members and Grassroots Allies, titled "Friends of the ANA".
 - With the exception of the ANA brochure, Friends' names will not be used in a public way without express permission on a case-by-case basis.
 - Voice in ANA decision making on Organizational Policies (one vote per member organization)
 - Friends have no "veto" power over public ANA statements.
 - Friends may serve on the ANA Board of Directors. No more than two Friends may serve on the Board at one time.
 - No more than a total of three Friends and Grassroots Allies may serve on the Board at one time.
 - Friends that are grassroots groups cannot receive travel subsidies to attend ANA meetings.

3. Responsibilities of ANA Friends:
 - Actively address issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities
 - Make an effort to attend ANA meetings and participate in ANA business between meetings.
 - Be responsive to communications from fellow ANA participants including:
 - agree to read ANA mail and respond in a timely manner
 - agree to return phone calls
 - participate on electronic communications system if at all possible
 - if on the electronic communications system, agree to log on at least once/week.
 - Contribute something to ANA
 - Be a responsible ANA meeting participant:
 - read materials in advance

- respect group process
- accept facilitation
- participate, don't dominate (i.e., use self-discipline)
- Work in good faith with ANA to resolve differences and problems.
- Comply with ANA's By-Laws and Policies and Procedures.

ANA Grassroots Allies Rights and Responsibilities

1. Who can be a Grassroots Ally?:
 - Organizations that work on a particular facility or work on policy issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities.
 - Organizations that sign on to the ANA By-Laws and Policies and Procedures.
Grassroots Allies are not required to sign on to the ANA Public Policy Position statements.
 - National organizations cannot be Grassroots Allies.

2. What ANA provides/offers to Grassroots Allies:
 - Grassroots Allies are invited to participate in ANA meetings, on ANA committees and task forces.
 - Grassroots Allies are invited to participate on the electronic communications system (with subsidy if financial need is shown).
 - Grassroots Allies have the option to sign on to Tier 2 and Tier 3 public statements.
 - Grassroots Allies will be listed on the ANA brochure in a separate category from Members and Friends, titled "Grassroots Allies of the ANA".
 - With the exception of the ANA brochure, Grassroots Allies' names will not be used in a public way without express permission on a case-by-case basis.
 - Voice in ANA decision making on Organizational Policies (one vote per member organization)
 - Grassroots Allies have no "veto" power over public ANA statements.
 - Grassroots Allies may serve on the ANA Board of Directors. No more than two Grassroots Allies may serve on the Board at one time.
 - No more than a total of three Friends and Grassroots Allies may serve on the Board at one time.
 - Grassroots Allies can receive travel subsidies to attend ANA meetings if financial need is shown.

3. Responsibilities of ANA Grassroots Allies:
 - Actively address issues pertaining to the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities.
 - Make an effort to attend ANA meetings and participate in ANA business between meetings.
 - Be responsive to communications from fellow ANA participants including:
 - agree to read ANA mail and respond in a timely manner
 - agree to return phone calls
 - participate on electronic communications system if at all possible
 - if on the electronic communications system, agree to log on at least once/week.
 - Contribute something to ANA

- Be a responsible ANA meeting participant:
 - read materials in advance
 - respect group process
 - accept facilitation
 - participate, don't dominate (i.e., use self-discipline)
- Work in good faith with ANA to resolve differences and problems.
- Comply with ANA's By-Laws and Policies and Procedures.

ANA International Friend Rights and Responsibilities

1. Who can be an International Friend?
 - Organizations from outside the USA that work on policy issues pertaining to the nuclear weapons complexes and related facilities.
 - International Friends are not required to sign on to the ANA By-Laws and Policies and Procedures.

2. What ANA provides/offers to International Friends:
 - International Friends are invited to participate in ANA meetings.
 - International Friends are invited to participate on the electronic communications system (without subsidy).
 - International Friends have the option to sign on to Tier 2 and Tier 3 public statements.
 - International Friends will be listed on the ANA brochure and webpage in a separate category from Members, Friends, and Grassroots Allies, titled "International Friends of the ANA".
 - International Friends will be invited to participate in training and educational work sponsored by ANA at its meetings, during DC Days, and on special occasions.

3. Guidelines for ANA/International Friends relationship
 - With the exception of the ANA brochure, 'International Friend' names will not be used in a public way without express permission on a case-by-case basis.
 - International Friends will not speak as representatives of ANA.
 - ANA will not speak as representatives of international friends.
 - International Friends may identify themselves as members of ANA in their home country, particularly with respect to calling attention to ANA position statements.
 - International Friends have no "veto" power over ANA policies, programs and public statements.
 - ANA has no "veto" power over International Friends' policies, programs and public statements.
 - International Friends will not pay Dues.
 - International Friends may not serve on the ANA Board of Directors.
 - International Friends are not eligible to receive travel subsidies.

4. Responsibilities of ANA International Friend:
 - Actively address issues pertaining to the nuclear weapons complexes and related facilities in their country.
 - Make an effort to participate in ANA business.
 - Participate on electronic communications system if at all possible

- Encouraged to participate in DC Days
- Encouraged to develop activities similar to DC Days in their home setting
- Be a responsible ANA meeting participant:
 - read materials in advance
 - respect group process
- Work in good faith with ANA to resolve differences and problems.

I - 4.

DUES POLICY
(ADOPTED 9/24/94, AMENDED 9/96, AMENDED 11/06)

RATIONALE:

To make sure the burden on new organizations is not prohibitive and to ensure that the burden on existing member and friend organizations is equitable;

To allow member and friend organizations to demonstrate their commitment to ANA, to each other, and to external funders.

FIGURING DUES:

Dues will be paid at the beginning of the calendar year.

Inability to pay dues is not intended to exclude organizations from membership or friendship in the ANA. Organizations experiencing financial hardships can apply to the ANA Board of Directors for a delayed payment schedule or, in extreme cases, a waiver.

ORGANIZATIONAL BUDGET RANGE	DUES
\$0 - \$ 10,000	\$75
\$10,001 - \$ 25,000	\$125
\$25,001 - \$ 50,000	\$250
\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$500
more than \$100,000	\$750

I - 5.

PROCESS FOR DECISION MAKING AT ANA MEETINGS

ANA POLICY:

*** Decision making at ANA meetings will include everyone present in the consensus process. Only ANA Members may block. One vote per Member group. We will work toward consensus in the following ways:

1. Seek unanimity through consensus process
 - spell out rules ahead of time.
 - strong facilitation -- intervening as needed
2. Fallback position: Agreement of 75% of Members present at the ANA mtg.

CONSENSUS PROCESS:

Types of Facilitation: Facilitator; Timekeeper; Vibes-Watcher

The Process:

1. Facilitator or proponent introduces issue
2. Go-round for input (no one speaks twice until everyone speaks once)
3. Discussion
 - a. Proposal formulated
 - b. Amendments offered
 - c. Concerns voiced
4. Proposal reformulated (if necessary)
5. Restate/Rewrite Proposal
 - a. Test for consensus (unanimity) - no minority leaves meeting in opposition to proposal.
 - b. Blocks (if any, go back to step 3c.)
 - c. Stand-asides (a type of abstention; willing to allow group to go forward; unwilling to work on proposal)
 - d. Approval
6. Divvy up tasks

BLOCKS: If you have a moral objection to a decision, you can block the decision (veto). The group must try to incorporate concerns of persons blocking the decision.

FALLBACK: If blocks cannot be removed by reformulated proposal, then move to super-majority of 75% of ANA Member groups.

I - 6.

FINANCIAL POLICY FOR MEETING ATTENDANCE

In recognition of the fact that ANA meetings are an important, essential part of our work together, efforts have been made to ensure that ANA groups are able to attend. There are several kinds of costs associated with these meetings, and the responsibilities are as follows:

TRANSPORTATION: At this time, the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability provides a subsidy for air fare booked at the lowest possible fare and necessary ground transportation (rental cars) to and from ANA meetings for one representative of each grassroots group that is an ANA Member.

In order for ANA to pay for a representative's plane ticket, the ticket must be booked in advance of the time limit specified by the airline and ANA to receive the lowest possible fare. If an ANA member books a ticket after this time limit, ANA will only pay the amount that the ticket would have cost if booked within the above-specified time limit, and the representative will be responsible for the difference. Airline cancellation fees will also be paid by the representative.

MEETING CONSULTANTS: The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability negotiates contracts with and pays fees and expenses for consultants, trainers, and non-ANA presenters.

MEETING FACILITY EXPENSES: The facility costs associated with ANA meetings include meals and lodging, meeting room rental, supplies and audio-visual equipment, coffee breaks and various surcharges.

Of these costs, ANA groups are asked to pay only their own costs for meals and lodging. The ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD) will continue to make every effort to choose meeting sites that are reasonably priced, so that the total cost per year per group for lodging and meals to attend three ANA meetings will remain at approximately \$750. Groups that have particular financial needs may ask the ANABOD to approve partial subsidies for lodging and meals (based on need). For budgeting purposes, such arrangements must be negotiated in advance of the ANA meeting.

If more than one person from an ANA group wishes to attend a meeting, approval must be given by the Board of Directors. All costs for additional persons must be taken care of by the group. This includes all transportation, food, and lodging costs.

In the event that ANA Member groups fail to pay ANA according to their agreement, travel subsidies for subsequent meetings will be reduced by the amount still owed.

I - 7.

PUBLIC PROFILE POLICY GUIDELINES

In recognition of the fact that the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) is composed of organizations with many different perspectives, these guidelines are intended to serve as parameters within which ANA groups may speak on behalf of the alliance. Three tiers of issues and policy statements are described below.

FIRST TIER

First tier issues are broad, sweeping non-controversial positions about which the ANA is clearly in agreement. With this set of issues, the ANA is able to initiate or react to statements in a public way under the banner of the ANA. Requests to issue a first tier statement using the ANA name should be submitted to the ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD) for approval. The ANABOD is empowered to solicit ANA input as needed, verify accuracy of statements, and decide whether or not statements qualify as first-tier. First-tier statements do NOT require affirmative sign-on by ANA groups.

At the present time, only positions explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights or approved as ANA policy positions by the full ANA membership will qualify automatically as First Tier statements. However, any candidate statement for second tier status that receives unanimous support from ANA Member groups will automatically become a First Tier statement.

Tier 1 statements appear on ANA letterhead that lists Member groups down the side.

SECOND TIER

Second tier issues are less general, more delicate positions regarding particular facilities or complex-wide problems. With these issues, individual ANA organizations may either initiate or react to statements under the ANA banner, but affirmative sign-on is required.

Requests to issue a second tier statement using the ANA name should be submitted to the ANABOD. The ANABOD will seek input from ANA Members. If 2/3 of ANA Members approve the statement (and there are no objections from others who choose not to sign on), the statement may become a Tier 2 statement.

If 2/3 of ANA Members approve, but others object, the ANABOD will arbitrate and then decide whether or not to proceed. If language changes would resolve the dispute, the ANABOD might suggest those changes to the initiator. If the dispute is not resolvable, the ANABOD will determine whether or not the issue should become Tier 3 as opposed to Tier 2.

Tier 2 statements appear on ANA letterhead that does not list Member groups down the side.

THIRD TIER

Third tier issues are controversial positions that some groups may need to articulate publicly while others may need to be well-distanced from. With these issues, individual organizations may work together to independently issue statements, but such statements would not use the ANA name and none of the rest of the ANA (including the Board of Directors) would have any role.

Tier 3 statements will not be issued on ANA letterhead.

I - 8.

PROCESS FOR APPLYING TO BECOME A MEMBER OR FRIEND OF THE ALLIANCE FOR NUCLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY

Inquiries about becoming an ANA Member or Friend should be addressed to the ANA office in Seattle. When an inquiry is received, ANA staff will reply in writing by sending a letter outlining the application process and a description of ANA's current expansion criteria along with the ANA public policy positions and organizational procedures.

The application process is as follows:

1. The applicant organization will be asked to write a letter to ANA stating the group's interest in ANA and describing the applicant organization. The description would need to include something about the organization's history, focus, the kinds of strategies and tactics being used, and the organization's decision making structure. The applicant would also be asked to explain what its organization would bring to the ANA (in terms of skills, expertise, and anything else that might help the Network), what the organization hopes to gain from being part of ANA, and whether it wants to be considered to become a Member or Friend.
2. Once the applicant's letter is received, ANA staff would copy and distribute it to the ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD) or the relevant subcommittee designated to handle membership issues.
3. The ANABOD would then review the letter and determine whether there might be mutual benefits to establishing a more formal ANA relationship. If that seems logical, the applicant group would be invited to attend one ANA meeting (at the group's own expense) so that both the applicant and the ANA could assess the fit.
4. Shortly after that ANA meeting, the ANABOD would notify the applicant of its decision about the organization becoming a Member or Friend of the ANA.
5. If the organization is invited to become a Member or Friend, that organization would be sent a letter and asked to complete an ANA authorization/release form acknowledging acceptance of ANA's terms for becoming a Member or Friend.
6. If the ANABOD decides against inviting the organization to become a Member or Friend, a letter will be written to the applicant describing the reasons for that decision.

7. In either case, ANA Members and Friends will be informed of the ANABOD's decision. There will be no appeals process for groups not accepted to become ANA Members or Friends. However, any group may reapply to ANA.

I - 9.

ANA TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP RESOLUTION AND APPEALS PROCESS

Fulfillment of ANA Members and Friends responsibilities by all ANA Members and Friends is fundamental to the success of our network. This process is intended to examine a spectrum of reasonable alternatives which may enable the parties to resolve the dispute in a manner advantageous to all. In the event the Board of Directors determines that a group is not fulfilling these responsibilities, and that the group should therefore no longer be a part of the ANA, the following steps will be taken:

1. The ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD) will document in writing specific examples of where the Member or Friend group has not fulfilled its responsibilities, will communicate its concerns to the group by phone, and will send a copy of its concerns along with the explanation of the appeals process to the group by certified mail.
2. The group will be asked to respond to the concerns of the ANABOD within thirty days in writing and to indicate whether or not they are interested in continuing participation in the ANA. In the event that communication by phone is impossible or the group fails to respond within thirty days, the ANABOD will send a second copy of the letter by certified mail, after the receipt of which the group will have two weeks to respond in writing.
3. At this point, either:
 - a. extenuating circumstances will be clarified and we will work to resolve areas of concern
 - b. the group will recognize that it is no longer appropriate for it to be part of ANA
 - c. satisfactory resolution cannot be reached:
4. If satisfactory resolution cannot be reached, and at least one party recognizes an impasse, the following steps would be taken. At this time:
 - a. either the ANABOD or the group would declare that an impasse exists and would seek resolution of outstanding concerns.
 - b. the entire ANA would be made aware of the process to date, provided with copies of the ANABOD's documentation of concerns, the appellant's written statement or position, and other appropriate supporting materials.
 - c. the decision on resolution would be made by a five-member Resolution Panel selected at random from among the ANA membership.

5. The process will be as follows:
 - a. Within two weeks of the recognition of an impasse, either party (the first to ask will be the Requesting Party; the other will be the Responding Party) will request a hearing before the Resolution Panel, notifying the other party by phone and/or mail immediately.
 - b. The Resolution Panel will meet:
 - (1) the day prior to the next ANA meeting; or
 - (2) at a meeting separate from an ANA meeting.(which might be conducted via conference call.)

(The first option would be preferable unless extenuating circumstances demand quicker action.)
 - c. Since all parties have presented their best cases on paper (the ANABOD when it raises the concern, the group in its response), the Resolution Panel may or may not request the group or members of the ANABOD to be present for any or all of the hearing. The Resolution Panel shall give the group and the ANABOD the option to be present for any or all of the hearing to make an oral presentation regarding the facts under discussion and/or to answer clarifying questions.
 - d. The Resolution Panel will come to a decision as soon as possible after the conclusion of the hearing.
 - e. A simple majority (3 members) is required for a final decision.
 - f. The decision of the Resolution Panel is final.
 - g. The Resolution Panel will communicate its decision and a statement of rationale to the group and the ANA.
 - h. The Resolution Panel will keep a record of its proceedings; the record will be open for review unless the group whose membership is in question requests the record be closed.

I - 10.

ALLIANCE FOR NUCLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS FOR SELECTING PEOPLE TO SERVE ON PANELS

On occasion, ANA is asked to identify people to serve on panels. In the event that such a request is received, the following process would be used:

1. ANA staff would seek to establish the purpose of the panel.
2. If possible, the relevant ANA Priority Working Group (PWG) would be asked to establish criteria for involvement on the panel.
3. If there is not a relevant ANA PWG, the ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD) would be asked to establish criteria for involvement on the panel. (Possible criteria might include: experience; history and investment in the issue; balance in terms of geography, race and gender; growth opportunities; economic status; interest; etc.)
4. Once these criteria are established, an announcement should be posted on the electronic communications system and mailed to all Members not on the electronic communications system. The announcement should state clearly the purpose of the panel, the number of seats available, and the criteria for participation. Anyone interested in being considered should let the ANABOD know.
5. In the event that there are more applicants than available slots, the ANABOD will first check to see if more slots can be provided. If not, the applicants will be informed that there are not enough available slots and will be asked to self-select from the pool of applicants.

In some cases, individuals are selected to serve on panels and boards, not as ANA representatives, but as representatives of their own organizations or as issue experts. It would be most helpful if those individuals would notify the rest of the ANA about their selection (who made the selection, what panel) so there is no confusion about who they are representing or how they were selected to serve.

I - 11.

ANA ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

(ADOPTED FEBRUARY 1997)

(AMENDMENTS ADOPTED OCTOBER 1999)

(AMENDED APRIL 2004)

BASIC INFORMATION AND POLICIES:

One benefit of membership in the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability is access to our electronic communications network. Electronic communication has been and continues to be an important part of what makes the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) an effective national alliance of organizations working to address issues of nuclear weapons production and waste clean-up. Below are some guidelines and policies to facilitate electronic communication within ANA.

The ANA provides Internet access for key leaders of ANA member groups who do not have alternative email access, including private e-mail accounts, private listserves and a webpage for the use of the network. The ANA contact for electronic communications issues will be ANA's administrative staff person.

In order to communicate effectively with other ANA Member, Friend, Grassroots Ally, and International Friend groups you will need a private e-mail account/mailbox as well as access to ANA's private lists. Your private mailbox is a place for you to send and receive messages from individuals and groups of individuals who have access to the Internet. Only you will be able to see the messages you receive in your private mailbox. ANA's private listserves provide a place where you may post and respond to messages for more discussion in the ANA community. Access to ANA's private listserves is restricted to ANA Members, ANA Friends, ANA Grassroots Allies, International Friends, and others who fulfill criteria, which are outlined in this policy.

ANA Communications Committee:

** The Board of Directors will appoint a Communications Committee that will act as the "gatekeepers" to ANA's private listserves and resolve other issues pertaining to electronic communication. The Communications Committee will consist of:

- ANA's administrative staff person
- one "At-Large" ANA member
- one member of the Board of Directors
- ANA's Director (ex-officio)

Using Electronic Communication:

** ANA's Internet Service Provider (ISP) provides detailed instructions for use of their system as well as software and technical assistance. ANA staff is also available for consultation, especially for new users. For answers to your questions, call ANA at 206/547-3175 or consult your ISP's manual for the toll-free, 24-hour technical assistance line.

Expenses and Benefits:

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** Within the limits of the annual budget adopted by the Board of Directors with input from the membership, ANA will provide up to two unlimited internet access accounts for each ANA Member and Grassroots Ally group (National and Friend groups are not eligible for an e-mail subsidy).

** ANA Member and Grassroots Ally groups who have a member serving on ANA's Board of Directors are entitled to three internet access accounts for the duration of the Board Member's term.

** Additional ANA-subsidized 3rd accounts may be allowed to organizations upon review by ANA's Communications Committee and Board of Directors.

** Contact ANA's administrative staff person to open internet access accounts through ANA.

ANA's Private Lists:

** ANA maintains e-mail distribution lists (called "listserves") for its full membership, working groups, and Standing Committees. These lists allow a user to send out a "broadcast" message to many different people without having to enter all of the recipients' e-mail addresses. Distribution lists are particularly useful for disseminating information quickly to a wide range of people be they part of a working group or to the whole network.

** ANA's e-mail distribution lists are "closed" lists to allow ANA members to discuss strategy and internal issues privately. In order to maintain the integrity of ANA's lists, users are asked not to forward messages outside of the lists without getting permission from the original sender. Failure to abide by this policy may result in removal from ANA's distribution lists. This policy does not apply to Action Alerts, final press releases, messages with a "Please Post" request or anything else that is obviously intended for general distribution.

GETTING ON ANA's DISTRIBUTION LISTS:

** ANA's distribution lists are closed and only ANA's administrative staff is authorized to add new members to them.

** Inclusion on distribution lists for Standing Committees is automatic for members of those committees

* For ANA Members and Friends:

- anyone from an ANA Member, Friend, Grassroots Ally, or International Friend group may be on the appropriate lists as long as the ANA representative (the person designated on your group's Dues Authorization Form) from your group requests it

* For Others - Representatives of Organizations Not Belonging to the ANA

- two people from ANA Member, Friend, Grassroots Ally, or International Friend groups must agree to "sponsor" their participation on ANA's electronic network
- they must submit a brief statement on how their participation on ANA's lists is relevant to the goals and mission of ANA

- final approval will be made by the Communications Committee with input from the Board of Directors

GETTING OFF ANA's DISTRIBUTION LISTS:

- * You may ask the administrative staff person to remove you
- * You may be removed for misuse and abuse as defined below:

In the case of misuse and abuse, complaints should be forwarded to the administrative staff person who will pass them on to the Communications Committee for consideration. The Communications Committee will then make a recommendation to the Board of Directors who will make the final decision on removal.

Users of ANA's electronic communications network are urged to resolve differences at the earliest opportunity and at the lowest level.

- * What is "misuse or abuse"?

As outlined in the ANA's policies and procedures, Members, Friends and Grassroots Allies of ANA agree to work cooperatively together and to deal respectfully with one another. Failure to do this-- disruptive or destructive behavior, rudeness or disrespect, forwarding internal documents outside of ANA lists without permission, failure to abide by the guidelines and policy-- these are reasons for which one might have access denied. The Communications Committee will make every effort to address concerns and problems without resorting to denial of access.

I - 12.

ANA COMPLAINT RELIEF PROCESS (ADOPTED FEBRUARY 1997)

The ANA process for complaint relief is intended to be used to address internal ANA concerns regarding the behavior of ANA Members and Friends. It is predicated on ANA's By-laws and responsibilities outlined in the Policies and Procedures. The complaint relief process is based on a belief that even the best-intentioned people are less than perfect and that, from time to time, we expect problems to arise. We expect that problems typically will be resolved by the individuals concerned through less formal processes than this complaint relief process. However, this process provides a mechanism for dealing with problems which are not resolved by less formal means in a way which aims to restore the health of the network when it is in jeopardy.

Filing a Complaint is intended as a good faith effort to seek resolution of concerns or disputes. Since it seeks to restore health where there is a perception of a problem, it shall be considered an act of respect.

- 1.** A complaint may be filed by any Member or Friend of ANA. Complaints may deal with individuals or groups who are Members or Friends of ANA.
- 2.** A complaint must relate to internal ANA issues, process, or business and may not be directed toward issues or activities that arise outside ANA. A complaint shall state explicitly which portion(s) of the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures is alleged to have been violated and by whom. The complaint will include a description, and documentation when available, of efforts to reach resolution by less formal means.
- 3.** A complaint shall be filed with the Director of the ANA. In the event that the Director of the ANA is materially involved in the complaint, the complaint shall be filed with any member of the ANA Board of Directors.
- 4.** The Board of Directors shall hear complaints and shall determine if there is cause to proceed with the Complaint Relief Process. A determination of cause to proceed will be based on one or more of the following:
 - * the Complaint does meet the criteria in Sections 1 and 2 above;
 - * the evidence available to the Board of Directors
 - * the statements of the Complainant and Respondent
 - * the testimony of others involved.
- 5.** If no cause to proceed with the Complaint Relief Process is found, the complainant shall be notified of the finding by the Board of Directors.
- 6.** If cause to proceed with the Complaint Relief Process is found, the Board of Directors shall:
 - A.** establish a Complaint Response Team composed of no more than five members, three of whom shall be members of the Board of Directors, to implement the Complaint Relief Process;

* When appointing the Complaint Response Team, the Board of Directors will ask each candidate to identify any reason(s) he or she may know of which might give a Complainant or Respondent cause to question the fairness of the Complaint Response Team due to the candidate's participation.

B. establish an "expected timeline," normally not to exceed six weeks, for completion of the Complaint Relief Process;

C. notify the ANA membership that a complaint has been filed and that the Complaint Relief Process is being implemented; and

D. inform all directly affected parties of the complaint in its specifics and outline in writing the process, together with the expected timeline, for the implementation of the Complaint Relief Process.

7. If the Complaint is directed toward the actions of the Board of Directors, the Policy Education Group shall appoint the five members of the Complaint Response Team and carry out the responsibilities assigned to the Board of Directors by this Complaint Relief Process.

8. The Complaint Relief Process shall have 5 stages. At the conclusion of each stage, the Complaint Response Team shall fully inform the Board of Directors of its progress, conclusions, and any recommendations. The Board of Directors can, at any stage, determine that the Complaint Relief Process has adequately addressed the Complaint and conclude the Complaint Relief Process. Such a determination will normally be made in consultation with the Complaint Response Team.

A. Stage 1. Clarifying the complaint.

i. The Complaint Response Team will make sure that it understands the specifics of any complaint filed and may ask the Complainant to clarify or expound upon the original complaint.

B. Stage 2. Gathering information.

i. The Complaint Response Team will provide a copy of the complaint to the Respondent and will provide an opportunity for the Respondent to provide, within five working days, a written reply to the particulars of the complaint.

* The Respondent may request a one-week extension when necessary in order to prepare his/her response to the complaint. The request for extension will include the reason for the request. Reasonable requests will normally be granted.

ii. The Complaint Response Team will survey by phone, e-mail, interview or in writing, any other Members or Friends who are known to be witnesses to the events included in the complaint. The results of this survey shall be considered confidential to the Board of Directors.

iii. The Complaint Response Team will consider requests from the Complainant or the Respondent to interview parties who may have information bearing on the complaint. The Complaint Response Team will use its discretion in responding to such requests. The results of any such fact-finding shall be considered confidential to the Board of Directors.

C. Stage 3. Preparing a Finding and Recommendation.

i. The Complaint Response Team shall prepare a draft Finding(s) which responds to each specific part of a Complaint, finding either that the Complaint is valid or not valid.

ii. The Complaint Response Team shall set out its Finding(s) in as much detail as possible, protecting the confidentiality of all parties. The Finding(s) shall make explicit reference to the portions of the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures in question

iii. The Complaint Response Team shall use its discretion in determining the Action to be recommended in response to each Finding. Such discretion shall normally be informed by several factors, including: the nature, number and severity of the violation(s) of the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures; the cooperative or uncooperative stance of the Respondent; the willingness of the party found at fault to accept the decision of the Board of Directors; etc. (see Section 11, below).

iv. Actions may include:

- a.** a letter of concern to the party found at fault
- b.** a period of probation for the party found at fault
- c.** a letter of definite suspension for the party found at fault
- d.** a letter of indefinite suspension for the party found at fault

v. For each Finding of violation, the Complaint Response Team shall recommended an Action to the Board of Directors for concurrence, dissent, referral or amendment.

vi. The Complaint Response Team shall make its report to the Management Board as soon as possible after the preparation of the draft Finding(s) and Recommendation of Action.

D. Stage 4. Concurrence or Dissent

i. If the Board of Directors concurs with any or all parts of the Finding(s) and Recommendations of Action of the Complaint Response Team, the Board of Directors shall inform the Complainant and the Respondent, hereinafter "the party found at fault," of its action at this time.

ii. If the Board of Directors does not concur (dissents) from the any or all parts of the Finding(s) and recommended Action, those parts of the Finding(s) may be:
* dismissed(Complainant and Respondent shall be notified of dismissal);

* amended (the Board of Directors shall state in writing the reasons for its amendment of the Recommended Action);

* or referred back to the Complaint Response Team for further consideration. Referral shall be accompanied by an explanation of the reasons for referral and any guidance appropriate from the Board of Directors. In the event the Complaint Response Team amends its Finding(s) or Recommendation for Action, it shall report to the Board of Directors immediately, and the process proceeds according to Stage 4.

F. Stage 5. Communication of Decision of the Board of Directors

i. The decision of the Board of Directors shall be communicated to:

- a.** The Respondent or party found at fault
- b.** The Complainant
- c.** The Board of Directors of the organization represented by the party found at fault.
- d.** The membership of ANA

ii. The decision of the Board of Directors shall be communicated as quickly as possible to a, b, and c above and, after three additional working days, to the Membership of ANA.

9. The decision of the ANA Board of Directors shall be the final resolution of the Complaint. If complaints involved actions of the Board of Directors, the decision of the Legislative Action Coordinating Committee shall be the final resolution of the Complaint.

10. Relationship between ANA, Member or Friend groups, and representatives of Member or Friend groups.

A. Complaints may deal with individuals or groups who are Members or Friends of ANA.

B. When Complaints involve only the activities of an individual, the Action(s) taken by the Board of Directors shall apply only to the individual party at fault. {This means that suspension of an individual, even indefinite suspension, does not mean the group can not participate; the group may select another representative to the ANA.}

C. When Complaints are determined by the Complaint Response Team to involve the activities of a Member or Friend group, the Action(s) shall apply to the group as a whole. (Refer to ANA Policies and Procedures for ANA Resolution and Appeals process for groups.)

11. Definitions of Actions

A. a letter of concern directed to the party found at fault

i. A letter of concern directed to the party found at fault acknowledges the concern of the Board of Directors that a violation of ANA By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures is believed to have occurred, notes the cooperation of the party at fault with the Complaint Resolution Process, encourages more conscientious attention to the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures, and effectively dismissed the complaint and puts the events of the violation in the past.

- ii.** a letter of concern may be indicated by:
- * a first, single, unintentional violation
 - * the cooperation of the Respondent
 - * the testimony of others involved

B. a period of probation for the party found at fault

i. A letter of probation acknowledges a violation(s) of ANA By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures by the party at fault and establishes a fixed period of probation (not to exceed one year) during which any further Finding of violation of the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures shall lead to a definite suspension or removal from the ANA.

- ii.** a period of probation may be indicated by:
- * a first violation
 - * a single violation
 - * a violation deemed unintentional or inadvertent
 - * a violation with recognized extenuating circumstances
 - * the cooperation of the Respondent
 - * the testimony of others involved

C. a period of definite suspension for the party found at fault

i. A letter of definite suspension acknowledges a serious violation(s) of ANA By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures by the party found at fault and establishes a definite period of time, not to exceed two years, during which the party found at fault shall not participate in the activities, events, meetings, or call of ANA or its Priority Working Groups of committees. Other privileges of membership (as outlined in the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures) will also be suspended. At the conclusion of the period of definite suspension, the party found at fault may reapply to the Board of Directors for the privileges of participation in ANA. It is expected that, at the conclusion of the period of definite suspension, renewal of privileges of participation will be granted unless activities during the period of suspension warrant otherwise.

- ii.** a period of definite suspension may be indicated by:
- * second violations
 - * multiple or repeat violations
 - * a violation determined to be intentional and willful
 - * non-cooperation by the Respondent
 - * the testimony of others involved

D. a period of indefinite suspension for the party found at fault

i. A letter of indefinite suspension acknowledges a serious violation(s) of ANA By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures by the party found at fault and removes the party found at fault from participation in the activities, events, meetings, or call of ANA or its Priority Working Groups or committees for an indefinite period of time, not less than one year. A letter of indefinite suspension effectively terminates the relationship between ANA and the party found at fault until such time as the party requests reconsideration by the ANA BOD. The decision to reconsider, as well as the decision to renew the privileges of participation to any suspended Member shall be at the discretion of the BOD.

ii. A period of indefinite suspension may be indicated by:

- * second violations
- * multiple or repeat violations
- * a violation determined to be intentional and willful
- * non-cooperation by the Respondent
- * the testimony of others involved

12. The actions of ANA Members and Friends from which complaints are likely to arise are found in the By-laws and/or Policies and Procedures. Assigning a degree of "seriousness" to a category of violation is difficult. However, the Board of Directors considers two categories of violation inherently serious. Those are:

A. Violations of the "Operating Principles," the first two bullets:

- * In all our actions we will respect the individual and cultural differences of our members as well as value the unique contributions of each culture to the world's history and future success of the ANA.
- * We will treat all people of color and other disenfranchised groups as equal partners including representation on all boards, sharing of resources, and implementation of programs.

B. Violations of "Member and Friend Rights and Responsibilities," the section which says: "Work in good faith with ANA to resolve differences and problems."

I - 13.

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability BOARD OF DIRECTORS RESPONSIBILITIES (Approved 12/13/94; Revised 9/16/95; Amended 10/14/99)

A. Board of Directors Operations

The operations of the Board of Directors will be conducted according to the ANA By-Laws and the Policies and Procedures. In case of conflicts, the By-Laws are controlling.

The Board of Directors:

1. Shall ensure that policies of the ANA are carried out.
2. Shall enforce the By-Laws and Policies and Procedures of the ANA.
3. Shall act in the best long-term interest of the ANA.
4. Shall disclose any potential conflicts (adverse interest) pertaining to the affairs of the ANA whether in fact or perception. Should a situation arise in which a conflict exists, the person or persons involved shall abstain from voting on that issue.
5. May not act as an agent of the ANA or ANABOD without the express authority to do so.
6. Must exercise a fiduciary duty to the ANA.

B. Membership

1. While membership of the BOD is intended to represent a variety of the members and friends of the ANA, membership on the BOD is personal and not representative. Members may not vote by proxy, and attendance and other requirements of membership cannot be satisfied by substitutes.

2. Attendance at regular and special meetings is required of all members, except for emergencies or other compelling circumstance (as determined by the Board with notification given to the Board prior to the meeting). A member who misses three consecutive meetings, has two unapproved absences, or is unable to participate in the majority of the Board's meetings and/or activities within a twelve month period shall be deemed to have resigned.

Should the issue of attendance and participation of a member of the Board arise, a representative of the Board shall contact the member and discuss the problem. If the issue continues and cannot be resolved a representative of the Board shall contact the member again and offer the option of resignation prior to a formal action of removal.

The definition of an approved absence will be determined by the Board. Attendance means the entire length of a meeting. Meetings may be conducted by conference calls, in person,

by the electronic communications system, or any means of communication necessary to conduct the activities of the ANA and the Board.

C. Meetings

1. Regular meetings will be held. Additional or special meetings may be scheduled when necessary with notice given to all members.
2. Notice of meetings shall be given by mail, telephone, fax or through the electronic communications system at least seven days in advance. Notice shall include time, place, date and subject of the meeting.
3. An agenda for all meetings shall be provided to all members in advance of the meeting. The agenda shall include at least the time, date and place of the meeting, topics to be covered and any other relevant information.

D. Executive Session

Most ANABOD discussions are shared as minutes with the membership via email, at ANA meetings and/or through the Seattle office. However, at times, the Board has a need to meet in Executive Session—that is, in sessions for which recorded minutes are not circulated. Examples of possible situations are these:

*investigating alleged improper conduct of a board member.

*litigation.

*personnel or organizational matter where a board, staff, or ANA member requests confidentiality and it is granted by those on the call.

Guidelines for Executive Session (ES):

- 1) The Board will minimize the use of Executive Session.
- 2) All Board members and staff participate, unless excluded by the nature of the topic or by the action of the Board.
- 3) Executive session may be called to deal with a specific topic; it is limited to this topic and ends when the topic has been handled.
- 4) A clear decision to go into ES is required and must be recorded in the minutes available to ANA members.
- 5) Minutes of ES, including date and time, persons participating, and the topic will be recorded for circulation to ANA members.
- 6) The Board will decide whether to retain or distribute to ANA members confidential minutes regarding the discussion and/or any decision(s) made in ES.

- 7) The Board will report any decision(s) and such other details the Board deems relevant and appropriate of its executive session discussion(s) to the membership.

E. Applications

These ground rules shall apply to the ANABOD, its standing committees and any other committee(s) which are selected to assist the BOD in conducting its affairs. Actions undertaken in conflict with the By-Laws and Policies and Procedures of the ANA, by members of the ANABOD and its committees without the consent of the BOD may subject that person or persons to removal from the Board or the committee on which he/she serves.

Appendix

The following explanation of the fiduciary duty was taken from *Business Law and the Regulatory Environment, Concepts and Cases*, 6th Edition.

Fiduciary Duty:

1. To act within the authority of the position and within the objectives and powers of the network.
2. To act in due care in conducting the affairs of the network.
3. To act with loyalty to the network.

Duty of Care:

1. To act in good faith.
2. To exercise the care an ordinary prudent person in a position would exercise under similar circumstances.
3. When exercising his/her business judgment, to act with the belief, premised upon a rational basis, that his/her decision is in the best interest of the network.

Duty of Loyalty:

1. Shall not be influenced by any consideration other than the welfare of the network. May not profit at the expense of the network and in conflicts with its rights; may not for personal gain divert unto him/herself the opportunities which in equity and fairness belong to the network.
 - * No related-party (self-dealing) transactions
 - * No loans
 - * No usurpation of opportunities
 - * No disclosure of confidential information relating to personnel matters.

Definitions

Prudent Person - common sense, practical wisdom and informed judgment

Premised - a statement of fact made or implied as a basis of argument

Usurp - to seize and hold by force or without right

PERSONNEL COMMITTEE
(ADOPTED OCTOBER 1999, REVISED 11/06)

The Board of Directors will establish a Personnel Committee, which will report directly to the Board. The Personnel Committee will be appointed by the Board of Directors, with input from staff. The staff may provide the Board of Directors with a list of potential candidates so that the Board of Directors may appoint the Personnel Committee.

The Personnel Committee will conduct annual staff evaluation to support recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding the performance of the ANA staff, conduct periodic reviews of the Employee Handbook and/or Policies and Procedures, and if warranted, provide an impartial venue for employee grievances and/or problems.

The Personnel Committee will consist of the Director, one member of the Board and two to three members at large, and represent the diverse nature of the organization. The length of each member's term on the Personnel Committee will be two years, with alternate terms for at least two of the members. Additional responsibilities of membership may be determined and assigned by the Board of Directors.

**POLICY EDUCATION GROUP
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

(ADOPTED MAY 1998, REVISED 11/06)

The Policy Education Group (PEG) is established as a committee of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, convened when the ANA membership and Board of Directors deem it necessary for an additional advisory body to be liaise between the membership, staff, and Board. When convened, the PEG is to be elected at a membership meeting. The PEG, when active, shall consist of 6 to 8 members, with representation from all working groups, and serve in an advisory capacity to the ANA Board of Directors and membership. The PEG will communicate to the Board of Directors through periodic work summaries, and periodically reporting at board meetings. The PEG may have a representative on the Personnel Committee. The Board of Directors can appoint PEG representatives to other committees.

The PEG, with the assistance of the Director, Program Director and the working groups, will provide recommendations to the Board pertaining to the current and long-term strategies/goals as they relate to the program/issue work of ANA. The PEG will regularly communicate with the membership, and it serves as a liaison to working groups. The PEG will hold regular conference calls, at which both the Director and Program Director will participate, and the minutes of these meetings are to be posted to the membership via electronic communications. The PEG can lead as needed special program/issue projects. Additional responsibilities may be determined by the PEG and the Board of Directors.

ROLE OF ANA DIRECTOR

(ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 1998)

Role of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability Director

The Director of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) is responsible for facilitating the issue work of ANA, daily organizational management and supervision of ANA staff and contractors, fundraising activities in support of ANA's work, and to serve as the principle liaison to the ANA Board of Directors (ANABOD).

In addition to fiduciary duty, both implicit and explicit in the director's responsibilities, and to provide for a more efficient manner of operations, it is necessary for the Director to perform the following tasks:

- * Participation in all ANA Board of Director calls and meetings;
- * Participation in all Policy Education Group, Priority Working Group and other committee calls and meetings when possible;
- * Maintain regular contact with the membership;
- * Supervise all staff including: regular staff check-ins on program work; approval of personnel issues such as leave requests, sign-off of time sheets, etc.;
- * Provide general oversight for all administrative and financial operations. Be primary signature on all bank accounts.
- * Provide relevant information, in both a decision making and informative manner as it relates to ANA and ANA personnel, to the ANABOD on a regular basis;
- * Publicly represent ANA when appropriate;
- * Remain abreast of both internal and external organizational and fiscal matters.

II - 1.

ANA POSITION ON NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR & TRITIUM ISSUES (ADOPTED APRIL 1991)

The ANA should not support production alternatives to New Production Reactor, but more importantly, should not take a position on production alternatives to New Production Reactor.

The Record of Decision for the New Production Reactor Capacity Environmental Impact Statement should be deferred until:

- Department Of Energy provides clear public proof that future tritium production is essential to national security.
- A mechanism is established for citizen participation in independent licensing, regulation, and enforcement of safety standards for the New Production Reactor; and the structuring of environmental protection and monitoring programs;
- The Reconfiguration and Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements (PEIS) are complete; and
- A scientifically and publicly credible process for managing wastes generated by the New Production Reactor has been established.

The PEIS process should include evaluation of the New Production Reactor.

II - 2.

ANA POSITION ON PLUTONIUM PIT FABRICATION (ADOPTED APRIL 1991)

The ANA opposes resumption of plutonium operations at Rocky Flats, and opposes all efforts to site, construct or operate new plutonium pit fabrication and plutonium recycling facilities unless and until:

- There is clear public justification of need for those operations and facilities;
- Such activities can be conducted in full compliance with all environmental, health and safety laws and regulations, and such compliance can be verified independently;
- Existing waste and contamination no longer present a hazard to human health and safety and the environment; and
- A legally adequate Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement that addresses all of these issues is completed.

II - 3.

ANA POSITIONS ON NUCLEAR WASTE ISSUES

(ADOPTED APRIL 1991; AMENDED JANUARY 1993)

ANA opposes disposal of nuclear waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) or Yucca Mountain because those sites were not selected by an objective, scientific process. WIPP and Yucca Mountain have environmental and safety problems which disqualify them as nuclear waste repositories.

ANA supports dedicated cleanup funding to achieve cleanup timelines, milestones and standards. ANA supports the development of legally enforceable agreements with independent regulators to ensure progress and accountability during cleanup of Department of Energy (DOE) facilities.

ANA opposes DOE or Congress acting to reduce or eliminate state regulatory authority over DOE facilities. Thus . . .

- ANA supports the Federal Facilities Compliance Act.
- ANA will support maintaining and strengthening Resource Conservation and Recovery Act authority over DOE
- ANA opposes any exclusions from environmental regulations for DOE.

ANA believes it is irresponsible to generate more nuclear or hazardous waste until existing wastes and contamination no longer present a hazard to human health and safety and the environment.

ANA supports independent regulation of currently unclassified and unregulated wastes at DOE facilities.

ANA supports interim stabilization and isolation of high-level and transuranic nuclear waste at the point of origin in a manner that maximizes worker, public and environmental protection. Therefore, ANA opposes the siting of monitored retrievable storage facilities for commercial wastes.

II - 4.

ANA POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTING

(ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 1991)

The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability recognizes that:

- The last Soviet nuclear weapons test was conducted in October 1990, and the Presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia have announced the closure of their test sites;
- Nuclear weapons testing is at the heart of the arms "race"
- The primary mission of the Department Of Energy's weapons labs is the design and testing of nuclear weapons
- Design and testing of nuclear weapons causes environmental damage, creates dangerous toxic and radioactive wastes and threatens human health.
- The DOE has not engaged in full public debate regarding its justifications for continued nuclear testing.
- Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties are part of the Supreme law of the land.
- Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits the United States to "... pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament..." The treaty also specifically calls on the U.S. to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban.
- The 1863 treaty of Ruby Valley recognizes the sovereignty of the Western Shoshone Nation over Great Basin lands that include the Nevada Test Site.
- Prior compensation to the victims of nuclear weapons testing has been inadequate.

Therefore, the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability calls for:

1. The cessation of all nuclear testing and related activities at the Nevada Test Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory, and completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban as soon as possible;
2. Full and independent characterization of environmental impacts of the testing program, and continued monitoring and containment of radiation and toxics released into the environment by the program;
3. Independent health studies of test site workers and downwinders;
4. Environmental restoration and full recognition of Western Shoshone land rights and sovereignty at the Nevada Test Site;

5. Transfer of funds from nuclear weapons research, design and testing to environmental restoration, medical care and reparations for victims and their families; and
6. Conversion of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site to legal, socially constructive, and environmentally sound purposes.

II - 5.

ANA POSITION ON DISMANTLEMENT

(ADOPTED APRIL 1993)

The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) recognizes that the on-going arms control process is dramatically reducing nuclear weapons arsenals worldwide. ANA supports establishing international verification procedures to ensure that agreements to retire and dismantle warheads are fulfilled.

ANA regards current treaties and agreements as solemn commitments which, though imperfect, serve as an important first step to promote future agreements to reduce and control nuclear materials worldwide.

ANA believes that it is possible to conduct the dismantlement program in such a way that it enhances public confidence in the Department of Energy (DOE) and lays the foundation for many of the difficult, long-term decisions which must be made about the disposition of retired warhead materials.

To move toward this positive future, ANA finds:

- * Protection of environment, safety and health are of paramount importance in all dismantlement activities.
- * Regulation to verify DOE's effective implementation of dismantlement and storage procedures must be established.
- * International verification procedures, both to confirm dismantlement and track weapons materials, must be established in order to assure the long-term success of treaties and agreements, and future arms control efforts.
- * All information necessary for the formulation of sound public policy and for informed decision-making must be declassified and made publicly available.
- * Substantive, on-going public involvement in all decision making is fundamental.
- * An Environmental Impact Statement process on dismantlement should begin immediately to provide an integrated evaluation of, and plan for, the impacts of current dismantlement activities on the complex.
- * Dramatic changes in the world demand that past policies regarding warhead materials be changed. New policies must address the grave proliferation and environmental risks those materials pose.
- * Decisions regarding plutonium and highly enriched uranium from retired warheads should be made only through an open, public process.

- * Prior to the completion of the decision-making process concerning the disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the federal government must not initiate any action that predetermines the outcome.

II - 6.

ANA POSITION ON CLEANUP (ADOPTED OCTOBER 1996)

The nuclear arms race continues to create a legacy of radioactive and toxic contamination created in an atmosphere of secrecy, devoid of public input and external regulatory oversight. This legacy has been bequeathed to thousands of future generations. Public and independent regulatory accountability is necessary to ensure that the federal government fulfills its obligation to effectively clean up the legacy of the nuclear weapons complex contamination.

The term "cleanup" refers to the containment of nuclear and toxic waste and the remediation of nuclear and toxic contamination resulting from fissile material development and processing, nuclear weapons design, development, production and testing activities, and the restoration and protection of environments polluted by such activities.

Postponing the cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production can lead to greatly increased environmental cleanup obligations in the future. Historical delays and failure to address the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production is a fundamental reason why environmental cleanup is so challenging, hazardous and expensive today. The ANA believes that cleanup should be the foremost priority in near-term and long-term budget decision making.

- 1.** The federal government has a moral and legal obligation to address the deadly legacy of the weapons complex so that the health and safety of current and future generations and the environment are protected to the maximum extent possible.
- 2.** The primary criteria for all cleanup activities must be the protection of worker and public health and the environment.
- 3.** The appropriations process and Department of Energy's (DOE) budget planning must be reformed to stress stable funding and "polluter pays" principles.

The DOE cleanup program should not bear the financial cost of waste management activities for ongoing nuclear weapons design or production activities. For example, nuclear waste reprocessing of irradiated fuel, an environmentally unwise activity that produces weapons-usable nuclear material and maintains nuclear weapons production capacity, should not occur and should not be paid for by the DOE cleanup program.

Contractors involved in any work at DOE weapons facilities must be held financially and criminally liable for statutory violations that result from their activities.

- 4.** Tribes, states, and the public has a right to an early and substantive role in the decision-making process affecting the cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex, and to timely access to information necessary to carry out this role.

The ANA supports public participation mechanisms consistent with the principles described in the Final Report of the Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue

Committee. With successes few and far between, DOE's failure to consistently implement these principles has resulted in several poorly functioning Site Specific Advisory Boards/public participation processes.

- 5.** Cleanup should be independently regulated and enforced. Compliance with and strengthening of cleanup agreements are essential.
- 6.** The contracting system must be reformed to emphasize accountability and performance. In all instances, contractor indemnification is unacceptable.
- 7.** Incentive contracts and privatization initiatives, if pursued, should be constructed in ways that preserve accountability to the regulators and the public. It is imperative that such initiatives ensure strong and explicit worker, public, and environmental protection and local workforce stability.
- 8.** It is irresponsible to create more nuclear or hazardous waste for purposes other than cleanup and dismantlement of the nuclear weapons complex, and dismantlement of the nuclear weapons stockpile, until existing wastes and contamination no longer present a hazard to human health and the environment. Consistent with this, the DOE should implement aggressive waste prevention and minimization programs throughout the Department.
- 9.** The US has never had a credible, scientific plan for the disposition of nuclear waste including high level or transuranic waste. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and Yucca Mountain do not meet publicly acceptable plan for the disposition of radioactive materials that does not presume that WIPP and Yucca Mountain will be used.

As a result, priority must be given to waste treatment remedies that emphasize waste stabilization and containment in a manner that will allow for safe long-term storage at the point of generation to ensure that a hypothetical repository does not drive waste technology decisions.

- 10.** While the ultimate cleanup vision is achievement of background levels, technological, fiscal and environmental issues present impediments at this time. Given this, substantive community participation in determining cleanup levels is paramount.

Realizing that cleanup is a long-term vision, it is necessary to establish and achieve cleanup standards that are protective of human health and the environment. A national residual contamination standard protective of public health and the environment should be established. However, the states, US Environmental Protection Agency, and local communities must maintain the legal right to establish and enforce a stricter standard.

DOE should focus immediate attention on urgent cleanup priorities which pose a significant threat to human health and the environment.

The federal government must be committed to ongoing monitoring of any residual contamination. Such commitment includes exploration of funding to state and/or local governments to institute long-term environmental monitoring programs.

11. Risk assessment is inexact, can be highly subjective, and is subject to misuse. At best it is a useful tool in evaluating remedial actions at the facility level, but it should not serve as the basis for rankings of cleanup priorities. Numerous factors need to be considered when developing such rankings including, but not limited to: cultural, social, and economic factors, including environmental justice considerations; potential future use of the facility; intrinsic and future values of resources; regulatory requirements; and the availability of new or innovative technologies.

A thorough discussion of this matter appears in the Final Report of the Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee. ANA endorses the concepts and principles expressed in this section of the report and it appears as an attachment to the ANA cleanup position.

12. DOE's resolve to fully clean up contaminated sites must be absolute. However, ANA recognizes that institutional controls (such as fences, guards, and restrictive land use classifications) may be necessary in those cases where DOE has conclusively shown to the satisfaction of the local community that cleanup to unrestricted use is not feasible. Reliance on institutional controls as a means of avoiding cleanup commitments and responsibilities is unacceptable because of the long-term uncertainty of maintaining restricted access and the irresponsible shifting of hazards and costs onto future generations.

13. ANA recognizes that for certain cleanup challenges, technological fixes do not and may never exist. Understanding this, DOE should pursue development of technologies which are clearly linked to cleanup needs and are likely to succeed.

II - 7.

ANA POSITION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF WEAPONS USABLE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

(ADOPTED NOVEMBER 1996)

Plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and tritium are weapons usable radioactive materials (WURMs).

Neither new production of WURMs or nuclear weapons nor investment in production capability should be undertaken without full public debate and clear public proof of legitimate need. New production or investment in production should not be undertaken unless and until wastes from past production no longer present a hazard to human health and the environment.

Any true national security policy must reduce the risks to communities in which fissile material storage and disposition activities take place.

The following principles address all forms and types of WURMs, including scraps and residues. These principles apply to containers and facilities and apply to the full life-cycle of any activities, whether production, storage, (re)processing, or disposition:

1. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by any country, group, or individual must be prevented.
2. Workers, the public, and the environment must be protected.
3. Containers, buildings, and facilities must be demonstrably safe, secure, and reliable.
4. Information required for meaningful public participation, including information currently classified in the Stockpile Memorandum, must be made available to the public.
5. Federal and state agencies responsible for decisions regarding production, storage, or disposition must have clear and substantive policies for public participation which include the timely and adequate provision of information and an effective means for influencing the outcome of decisions.
6. Planning and decisions must be supported by the public process of the National Environmental Policy Act; National Environmental Policy Act documents must provide complete and accurate information and real alternative courses of action.
7. The United States and other governments should establish international controls over all surplus WURMs.
8. In the United States, state governments must have the power to inspect and regulate federal installations which handle, store, or dispose of WURMs.

9. The United States must develop, with full public participation, a coherent and consistent policy regarding domestic and foreign fissile materials.
10. Non-proliferation objectives and the environment, safety, and health of local communities must be the paramount concerns in all decisions.
11. Fissile materials should not be separated from spent fuel. Neither spent nuclear fuel processing nor stabilization should be undertaken without full public debate and clear public proof that those initiatives address genuine risks associated with interim storage.

Further the ANA believes:

1. Plutonium is a security, economic, environmental, safety, and health liability.
2. The following disposition options compromise nonproliferation goals and therefore should be discarded: new or existing reactors, accelerator-based reactors, any technique that involves separation of fissile material. The DOE should consider other options and should fund research and development for non-separation technologies (e.g. vitrification and small-scale pilot vitrification projects).
3. Decisions regarding storage and disposition should relate to a coherent, long-term plan
4. Decisions to store, use, or dispose of any WURMs should be based on credible economic analyses that consider the full life cycle costs.
5. Thus far, the US does not have a credible, scientific plan for the disposition of high-level or transuranic waste. WIPP and Yucca Mountain do not meet environment and health criteria. The US needs to develop a scientifically sound, publicly acceptable plan for disposition of fissile materials that does not presume WIPP and Yucca Mountain will be used.

II - 8.

POSITION ON HEALTH

(ADOPTED FEBRUARY 1997)

Activities at US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities have exposed residents of nearby communities to hazardous releases of radio nuclides, toxic chemicals, and other hazardous materials for over 50 years. These facilities and areas include those owned or operated by the U.S. government or private contractors that contribute to the development, production, testing, storage, disposal and management of nuclear weapons and fuels. During this time, workers at federal nuclear facilities were regularly exposed to radiation and hazardous materials. Residents of communities near these facilities were exposed to similar hazards without their knowledge and consent. In some instances people were exposed to radioactive materials under dubious ethical circumstances. Lands to which Native Americans hold treaty rights or on which they have lived are contaminated with a variety of chemical and radioactive materials ranging from uranium mill tailings to the effluents from nuclear reactors and chemical processing plants.

Historically, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors made few efforts to examine the public health consequences of off-site exposures even when off-site environmental monitoring was performed. This record, in part, resulted because the DOE and its predecessor agencies have been caught in a conflict between two competing missions: (1) developing and maintaining the nuclear weapons complex and (2) evaluating health effects from these same activities. In addition, these agencies have not been subject to independent regulation and oversight. Many releases were kept secret. The limited information that was shared with the public was presented in ways that purposefully ignored or downplayed the known potential dangers of exposures. Frequently, the data on which they relied were of questionable scientific quality.

This history has greatly eroded public trust and confidence in the agencies responsible for the management of the US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities. Community residents remain deeply concerned about observed increases in cancer, birth defects, and other diseases among families and neighbors as well as other environmental and animal abnormalities. These concerns have led to various studies across the country by federal and state public health departments and independent scientists. Scientific critiques of past federal-funded health studies have raised serious questions about the methodologies used and the interpretation of the results. Federal and state agency responses have been slow, and resources for these efforts have thus far been inadequate. As yet, there is no assurance that the legitimate health concerns that are currently known or that may come to light in the future will be addressed at all sites.

At the same time, residents of affected communities do not have the technical, financial, or medical resources to respond to the health effects they have encountered. There has been little effort to educate affected people about their past exposures and the potential health consequences of those exposures.

To respond to the health concerns of affected communities, the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability asserts the following:

1. The Federal government is accountable for environmental contamination and exposures from radio nuclides and toxic substances at US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities. The federal government must not only comply with the obligations to affected communities defined by law; it should strive to be a leader in the protection of human and environmental health to both current and future generations.

2. Government responsibility for the provision of health services, including screening, monitoring, and treatment should be based on the evidence and circumstances of exposure as determined through a process that meets the conditions described in points 3, 4, and 5 of this position statement. The circumstances surrounding the public exposures warrants a policy based on the following principles:

a) Provision of health services in affected communities should not be held hostage to the completion of multi-year dose reconstruction and epidemiological studies. Health services should provide a reasonable bias toward access to diagnostic and therapeutic care, such as clinics, screening, and counseling programs, which address immediate health care concerns.

b) Health services should provide meaningful and defensible margins of error that give potentially affected individuals the benefit of doubt, account for the circumstances of contamination (releases), and account for whether or not people were adequately informed of the exposures and risks.

c) Processes for determining who should have access to different kinds of health services in communities should be convened on a site-specific level, although nationally applied parameters are necessary to ensure fairness and accountability. Under certain conditions compensatory access to diagnostic and therapeutic care may be a necessary response to the government's moral obligation to care for people exposed to contamination from nuclear weapons and related facilities.

d) Health effects investigations should be conducted and reviewed by independent, qualified individuals in a manner that avoids the conflicts of interest that plagued past investigations.

A similar policy is warranted for workers exposed to radiation and/or hazardous chemicals even though the circumstances surrounding worker exposure are, in some ways, different. Although workers may consent to the risk of routine and accidental exposures, the government has an inherent responsibility to provide medical surveillance and, if warranted, medical care. The protocol for surveillance and the follow-up care should be developed by the DOE and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) with input from DOE worker organizations.

3. The implementation of meaningful public participation processes should be integrated into each stage of environmental and human health protection activities, including environmental monitoring, risk assessment, and hazard management. Meaningful participation in environmental health research and policy-making requires that partnerships with interested and affected communities be created. These partnerships should be used to inform the entire process of decision-making from defining the scope of the problem to the implementation of the

decisions that are made. Scientific analysis and public deliberation are complementary and must be integrated throughout health policy making; deliberation frames analysis, analysis informs deliberation, and the process benefits from feedback between the two. [1]

4. Partnerships should include federal agencies, health agency contractors, health care providers, and communities and they should: a) be publicly accountable, ensure independence, and use state of the art health assessment methodologies;

b) provide information, education, and training for communities to facilitate active, meaningful, and informed responses and;

c) be inclusive and respectful of community-based health information, such as cluster maps, exposure surveys, and other qualitative methods.

5. Risk assessment is inexact, can be highly subjective, and is subject to misuse. At best it is a useful tool for evaluating health effects in different populations, but it should not serve as the basis for setting priorities in health research or the provision of health services. Numerous factors need to be considered when developing priorities including, but not limited to: cultural, social, and economic factors, including environmental justice considerations; potential future use of the facility; intrinsic and future values of resources; and regulatory requirements. [2]

6. Communities and individuals have the right to access all historical and current data relating to possible health and environmental effects from activities at US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities including all sites used for nuclear testing and the storage and disposal of hazardous and radioactive materials. This information includes, but may not be limited to, information regarding:

a) routine and accidental emissions to the environment, both on and off site;

b) community exposure records, health studies, and any additional data related to community health effects that can be made available within the constraints of standard requirements to protect individual privacy;

c) worker exposure records, health studies, and any additional data related to worker health effects that can be made available within the constraints of standard requirements to protect individual privacy;

d) the environmental and ecological effects of releases from all DOE facilities.

7. Communities and individuals have the right to petition for appropriate and relevant health studies and health follow-up where data suggest that contamination from activities at US nuclear weapons complex and related facilities may be a contributing factor to community health concerns. Moreover, where government or health agency contractor studies related to public exposures and potential health effects are being considered or developed, communities should be notified and involved as early as possible and continuously as studies proceed. In all cases, the commissioning and administration of such studies should be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Department of Energy's and

Department of Health and Human Services' Memorandum of Understanding regarding the conduct of epidemiological research at DOE facilities. [3]

8. The federal government has an obligation to protect communities and workers from additional exposures to radio nuclides and toxic substances caused by activities at U.S. nuclear weapons complex and related facilities. The potentially affected public has a right to be notified of risks from these exposures as well as any residual risks that may remain after clean-up and remediation activities.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] National Research Council 1996. *Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.

[2] US EPA 1996. *Final Report of the Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee*. Washington, DC: Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, US EPA.

[3] Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of Energy and Department of Health and Human Services, May 1996.

POSITION ON OPENNESS

(ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 1997)

Openness between the government and the governed is essential for our democracy. Secrecy, the antithesis of openness, is a constant challenge to the democratic process. When secrecy is used to withhold or obscure information that should be public, the fundamentals of democracy are undermined. In a culture of secrecy, people are unable to make informed decisions on policy issues, nor can they then help inform and direct the decisions made by their elected officials.

The dominance by secrecy and non accountability has contributed to government malfeasance on a grand scale, as illustrated by the mismanagement of radioactive, hazardous, and other wastes in the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex that has created widespread contamination and cleanup problems. People acting in the public interest to expose secret activities have suffered, and continue to suffer reprisals for their actions.

Secrecy must be kept to a minimum by clearly defining the narrow bounds of its acceptance, by providing incentives for openness, and by deterring any culture that favors secrecy. Due regard for the privacy of individuals is essential, but can and should occur without compromising the release of pertinent information. With few exceptions, documents created at public expense should be public, whether they are created by government agencies, or by privately owned companies or organizations under contract to government.

In spite of the laws governing freedom of information, whistleblower protection, and the public right-to-know, openness continues to be obstructed by several layers of secrecy:

1.) For decades, the government has engaged in excessive classification and it continues to do so today. Thousands of federal employees are empowered to classify documents. While penalties exist for releasing classified information, there are no penalties for negligently classifying documents.

Recommendations:

--There should be a bulk declassification of broad categories of information, especially those relating to safety, environment, and health, with due regard to privacy.

--Indices of classified document titles should be declassified and made available.

--Declassified summaries of classified documents should be made public.

--The Atomic Energy Act and other laws that promote excessive and inappropriate classification should be changed, both to promote declassification and to restrict future classification.

--Establish a system of accountability for classifiers, sharply reduce the number of officials qualified to do classification, and these officials must justify the need for what they are classifying and they must be able to understand what they are classifying.

2.) Government agencies continue to withhold unclassified materials by restricting access, allowing contractors to claim academic or corporate proprietary rights, citing material as "unclassified controlled nuclear information," or delaying or obstructing the release of government funded scientific research.

Recommendations:

--The Freedom of Information act should be implemented to release available information in a timely and forthcoming manner.

--Complete and unqualified access to the records of government agencies and their contractors must be guaranteed, including electronic transfer.

--All records pertinent to public health, environmental protection and cleanup, and worker health should be made available without delay but within the constraints of standard requirements to protect individual privacy.

--The category of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information should be abolished.

3.) In spite of policies, regulations, and laws against reprisals towards whistleblowers, reprisals continue against people or organizations that release information to the public, raise safety or financial concerns in-house, or attempt to enforce existing rules and procedures.

Recommendations:

--Existing laws and regulations must be enforced to the point of deterring further reprisals.

--Mechanisms such as independent councils should be established and funded to review whistleblower complaints wherever there is a history of whistleblowers and where they are requested.

--Government and contractor personnel obligations to protect classified documents should not override their rights to expose violations of law and abuses of secrecy, which they should be able to do without fear of reprisal.

4.) People continue to be excluded from various, but most often earlier, stages of the decision making process, and are denied access to pertinent documents. In the case of the Department of Energy, unannounced, closed door negotiations between regulators, contractors, and DOE officials frequently occur prior to release of written proposed actions.

Recommendations:

---People should have access to all decision making processes, including receiving adequate announcements of meetings and having easy access to meetings, notes and reports regarding meetings, significant phone conversations, and electronic communications. Documents used in the decision making process should be routinely made public in a timely manner.

--Draft scientific, technical, environmental, and health documents pertaining to the decision-making process should be made accessible in a timely manner. Such documents should also be made accessible through electronic communications.

POSITION ON TRITIUM PRODUCTION

(ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 1998)

Tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen which has a half-life of about 12.3 years, is used to boost the explosive yield of nuclear weapons. Production of tritium for the US arsenal has contaminated the ground water, surface water, air, and soil at nuclear weapons production sites, and there is evidence of adverse health effects on populations near facilities that produce and handle tritium. The US stopped producing tritium for weapons in 1988 when it shut down the production reactor due to health and safety concerns. Since then, tritium from dismantled nuclear weapons has provided tritium for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In 1995, the Clinton Administration ordered the US Department of Energy (DOE) to find a new source of tritium for the US nuclear arsenal. The costs of such tritium production would be in addition to the \$4.5 billion annual budget for DOE's "Stockpile Stewardship and Management" program to maintain and upgrade the current nuclear weapons arsenal.

The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) opposes any renewed tritium production for nuclear weapons.

ANA finds that renewed tritium production for nuclear weapons is unnecessary, costly, undermines nonproliferation efforts, and threatens public health. In addition:

- * assumptions about the US nuclear stockpile used to justify renewed tritium production are not valid and public debate on the size and existence of the US nuclear arsenal has never taken place.
- * tritium production in civilian reactors (proposed by DOE) would violate a long-standing tenet of the Atomic Energy Act that US civilian nuclear power plants are not to be used to make weapons materials.
- * tritium production threatens public health. There is evidence of developmental, reproductive, and other disorders in individuals living around tritium production facilities and laboratories. Tritium in the form of tritiated water mimics ordinary hydrogen in the body and crosses the placenta.
- * renewed tritium production will divert attention and scarce resources from much-needed clean-up of the nuclear weapons complex. In addition, all of the tritium production methods being considered by DOE would create more radioactive waste.
- * the cost to produce more tritium for nuclear weapons is exorbitant.
- * renewed tritium production would undermine nonproliferation efforts by sending a signal that the United States is not committed to reducing its nuclear arsenal.

* under the START II arms control agreement, preparations for tritium production can be delayed at least until 2015. In addition, a framework for START III has already been agreed to, which would further reduce the nuclear arsenal..

The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability recommends that the U.S. government:

* abandon its plans to produce tritium for the US nuclear arsenal.

* comply with its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to step up its commitment to progress on nuclear arms reductions

* begin an informed public debate on the need, size and function of the US nuclear arsenal

* take measures to secure a national security policy which would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and other dangers and reduce environmental and health risks.

POSITION ON DE-ALERTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(ADOPTED DECEMBER 1998)

Despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear warheads remain on high alert. The deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the potential instabilities and problems in the control of nuclear weapons have increased the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

In order that nuclear dangers are reduced worldwide, de-alerting must be carried out by all states possessing nuclear weapons. There are various methods of de-alerting nuclear weapons. The urgency of the present situation requires that at least one effective de-alerting measure be carried out on all nuclear weapons in all states possessing nuclear weapons as much before the end of the year 1999 as technically possible.

It would be essentially impossible to conduct a nuclear first strike if all warheads are de-alerted. An option of retaliation in case another party strikes first would remain, until more steps were taken to eliminate that possibility -- that is, until the nuclear weapons states implement complete nuclear disarmament.

De-alerting is different from de-targeting (which the US and Russia say they have done, for instance). In the latter, the coordinates of the target are changed in the computer. De-targeting is unverifiable and can be reversed in seconds. Criteria for de-alerting include:

- * The time it takes to re-alert weapons (from a low of a few hours to days, weeks, months, or even years)
- * The complexity of re-alerting measures
- * The verification and monitoring arrangements under which de-alerting is carried out

The most effective de-alerting measure in the medium to long-term would be to remove all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles and store them remotely under multilateral monitoring. However, this de-alerting measure cannot be carried out in the short-term for all warheads of all states possessing nuclear weapons. To carry out this measure, adequate storage, monitoring and security arrangements must be made.

The urgency of nuclear dangers facing the world needs bold action. The risk of nuclear attack by miscalculation or accident is grave. For instance, during one 1995 incident, Russian radar operators mistook a US-Norwegian research rocket for an incoming missile and the "black suitcase" was sent to President Yeltsin so he could decide whether to fire Russian missiles at the US. De-alerting nuclear weapons would de-activate them to reduce or eliminate this risk. A part of the urgency is also associated with the potential problems with Year 2000 computer hardware and software. De-alerting can be a step towards nuclear disarmament, but does not have to be.

If one or more of the five nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) de-alerted their weapons, they would be in a better position to argue for non-

proliferation and ask others to follow suit. There is precedent for such action. In September 1991, as the Soviet Union was crumbling and the risk of tactical nuclear weapons becoming scattered in many countries or in black markets was rising, President Bush ordered the withdrawal of most US tactical nuclear weapons from deployment. President Gorbachev quickly followed suit, greatly reducing nuclear threats. Further, the five NPT nuclear weapons states could ask India, Pakistan, and Israel to join the de-alerting process more convincingly if they were ready to take such action themselves.

The danger today is at least as acute as it was in 1991; in some respects it is greater. The need is to get nuclear weapons off hair trigger alert. De-targeting meant that US and Russian weapons are not targeted at each other. The next logical step is to de-alert all of them, eliminate the risk of accidental nuclear war and greatly reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.

Recommendation:

All states possessing nuclear weapons commence de-alerting nuclear weapons immediately and complete at least one effective de-alerting measure on all nuclear weapons as soon as technically feasible.

**POSITION ON
ON-SITE RETRIEVABLE MONITORED STORAGE (ORMS)
OF TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE
(ADOPTED JANUARY 2000)**

Transuranic and high-level waste, as well as some other radioactive wastes, are contaminated by large quantities of radionuclides that are so long-lived they will remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. At many sites, waste has contaminated water resources, because it has been disposed of in the environment and there are no serious plans to recover this material and store it away from the environment. At other sites where this waste has accumulated, current government plans are to transport it over the next several decades for burial either at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico or at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The health risks and environmental harm that could result from contamination of areas either along nuclear waste transport routes or at sites intended for “permanent” nuclear waste disposal must not be substituted for the risks the wastes already pose.

We therefore advocate (1) storing transuranic and high-level nuclear waste in stable forms as close as possible to the site of waste generation in On-site Retrievable Monitored Storage (ORMS), while (2) conducting a focused and deliberate program of research on relevant technologies for long-term management and/or disposal of such waste. This program should not include reprocessing, pyroprocessing, or other processes that raise proliferation issues. We will strongly oppose any attempt to use our support for on-site storage to generate new nuclear waste from research, development, production, and testing of nuclear weapons or operation of any DOE reactors.

This approach avoids dangers with present disposal plans while continuing the search for a better solution. Any better solution will recognize that, because this waste remains dangerous for thousands of generations, every effort must be made to keep it isolated from natural ecosystems and rendered as safe and secure as possible.

Key Principles Regarding ORMS:

- 1) A fundamental principle for ORMS is not to contaminate new sites and to protect the environment at sites where waste is now stored or disposed. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) plans for nuclear waste disposal, whether at WIPP or at Yucca Mountain, risk contamination of non-contaminated areas by putting the waste into the environment. ORMS, by contrast, keeps waste at existing facilities, while isolating it as much as possible from the environment.
- 2) With ORMS, costs and risks associated with unnecessary nuclear waste transport are eliminated.
- 3) Waste placed in storage must be in stable form.

- 4) Any ORMS structure must be designed to be as safe and secure as possible. “Safe” means that radioactive or toxic releases that may occur from waste within a storage structure will be contained within the structure. “Secure” means the material within the structure is protected from theft, diversion, attack or terrorist act.
- 5) To be monitorable and retrievable, the material must be containerized within the cells of a storage structure, not dumped there.
- 6) A monitoring regimen needs to be established for both cells of the storage structure and the containers within. The main intent of monitoring is to be able to locate any specific problem-container quickly so it can be remediated.
- 7) All ORMS activity should be integrated into a given site’s long-term stewardship program, as well as the DOE’s overall long-term stewardship program.
- 8) Decision-making authority should be shared with the public and stakeholders who live in the vicinity.
- 9) A process for periodic review of each ORMS needs to be established. A publicly available report should be produced annually through an iterative process with the public stakeholders, the regulators, and the managers of each site. Each report should include the status of storage, new relevant technologies, and other options for dealing with the material. Recommendations for action may accompany these reviews.
- 10) Funding for monitoring and cleanup that takes into account the toxicity, quantity, and longevity of residual waste or contamination on site must be assured beyond the current approximately thirty-year requirement under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Something like a cleanup and long-term stewardship trust fund with an indefinite life span needs to be created for each ORMS site with full participation of affected populations. Costs should be borne primarily by institutions responsible for creation of the nuclear waste. Some funds must be set aside for unforeseen contingencies.

ANA POSITION ON NUCLEAR POWER
(ADOPTED JANUARY 2002)

Continuing attempts to treat nuclear weapons production and nuclear power generation as entirely separate endeavors are not credible. The artificial wall of separation between "military" and "civilian" nuclear activities in the United States has been irrevocably breached.

The manufacture and production of fuel for all nuclear reactors involves similar steps, including uranium mining and milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication and waste generation.

The Department of Energy is planning to use plutonium from its weapons program to manufacture mixed-oxide fuel for commercial reactors. A proposed high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is supposed to hold radioactive materials transported across the country from both civilian and DOE sites. A project is investigating the production of tritium to boost the yield of nuclear weapons in a civilian electric power reactor within the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Creation of additional plutonium, a material that can be separated for use in bombs, is an inevitable byproduct of the use of nuclear energy production. Thus, any new reactor construction adds to the existing challenges for controlling weapons usable nuclear materials and for verification of non-proliferation agreements.

All reactors generate long-lived highly radioactive waste materials for which there is no known treatment technology or safe storage facility. Pressure may increase to dump these wastes at already contaminated nuclear weapons production sites. There is also the risk of a return to separation technologies, such as reprocessing, to deal with the waste legacy. There are no known feasible technologies to neutralize or detoxify radionuclides.

Not surprisingly, the pattern of secrecy, denial of contamination, non-participatory decision-making, and harassment of whistle-blowers that has characterized the nuclear weapons production system is paralleled in the commercial nuclear power industry.

As residents of communities in the shadows of nuclear weapons production plants and related facilities, we have repeatedly spoken out for our fundamental rights to public safety, environmental quality, government accountability, and due process. For these very same reasons, the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability opposes new nuclear power facilities and endorses the phased closure of current civilian power reactors. We believe in a sustainable energy policy that focuses on increased energy efficiency and clean renewable energy technologies.

ANA POSITION ON DISARMAMENT
(ADOPTED NOVEMBER 2004)

In every country with nuclear weapons, government agencies have harmed their own people and polluted their land, air and water in the name of national security. Nuclear weapons testing and production have also damaged public health and contaminated natural resources in non-nuclear countries. In addition, the materials in nuclear weapons present major risks of proliferation, further threatening global peace and security.

To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, the United States signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The NPT internationally entered into force and was incorporated into U.S. national law in 1970. The United States renewed its commitment to the NPT in 1995, and again in 2000 by agreeing to 13 specific steps for implementation of the Treaty.

Article VI of the NPT commits all signatories, including the U.S., to "... pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament..." The International Court of Justice (World Court) affirmed that nuclear weapons are not legitimate weapons of war in 1996.

ANA regards the NPT and Court decision as creating solemn obligations, which should serve as the framework for establishing procedures to ensure that all countries retire and dismantle their nuclear warhead arsenals.

In conformity with its international legal commitments and to ensure a just, secure, healthy and sustainable world for future generations, ANA urges the government of the United States to join with the other nuclear weapons states in taking prompt and unequivocal actions to eliminate nuclear weapons around the world.

These actions should include: halting continued development of new and modified nuclear weapons; de-alerting current nuclear forces; addressing the environmental degradation and human suffering arising from testing, production, deployment and use of nuclear weapons; and undertaking negotiations with other countries on a treaty for their elimination within a time-bound framework.

The objective is a world free of the threat of nuclear holocaust by achieving the verifiable, enduring and global elimination of all nuclear weapons.

III – 1.

ANA Cross Travel Mini-Grants Policy

(3/24/99 Approved by BOD)

[Amended April 2004]

The purpose of Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) "cross travel" mini-grants is to support the goals and objectives of ANA by facilitating the participation of non-local ANA activists in hearings, meetings, press conferences or events at other ANA sites, within the limits of the annual budget adopted by the Board of Directors with input from the membership.

The upper limit of a given grant is \$500. Funding is intended to cover transportation expenses (i.e., airfare and mileage) for members of ANA groups traveling to assist other ANA groups. The host group will be expected to provide room and board.

Submitting an application does not guarantee funding. Applications will be reviewed by ANA's Board Co-Chairs* and ANA's Director based on the following criteria:

- Consistency with ANA's mission
- Timeliness/urgency of issue
- Financial need
- Geographic diversity
- Consistency with ANA's diversity goals
- Priority to host group which has never received a cross travel grant from ANA

Grant Process:

Cross Travel Mini Grant Application forms are available from ANA's Seattle Office and should be submitted to that office as well. Application forms must be received by the Seattle office six weeks prior to planned travel and must be submitted by the host group, not the traveler. Emergency grants (less than six weeks from travel) may be considered if appropriate documentation of last-minute need is provided.

Applicants will be notified of the decision on their application within 10 working days of its submission. Grants will be paid as a travel reimbursement upon presentation of appropriate receipts and documentation.

*If a Board Co-Chair's organization is making a mini-grant request, another Board member will be selected to review the application.

ANA Cross Travel Mini-Grants Application Form

*****IMPORTANT: Please read the Cross Travel Mini Grants Policy carefully before filling out this form*****

Host/Applicant Group:

Contact Person for Applicant Group:

Group's Mailing Address:

ph:

fax:

e-mail:

Visiting ANA Group Name:

Person Who Will be Traveling:

Dates of Travel:

Estimated amount of transportation expenses:

Purpose of trip as it relates to the goals, objectives and mission of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability:

(OVER)

Please address the timeliness and urgency of the event/issue you are asking cross-travel assistance for. Why does this event need to happen now?

If ANA was unable to grant you travel assistance, would you be able to secure funds from another source?

How does your event advance ANA's diversity goals?

Has host group received a cross-travel grant from ANA before?
If so, when?

III – 2

ANA Conference Call Subsidy Policy

(00/4/17 Approved by BOD)

[Amended April 2004]

The purpose of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) Conference Call Subsidy Policy is to support the goals and objectives of ANA by facilitating the participation of ANA activists in conference calls pertaining to the work of ANA, within the limits of the annual budget adopted by the Board of Directors with input from the membership.

ANA grassroots member groups can request a subsidy for one person to participate in conference calls for one of the ANA working groups or tasks forces for one year. This request must be from the member group, who can determine who the participant will be. The subsidy can be shared, but only one person from a group can be subsidized on any specific call.

Submitting an application does not guarantee a subsidy. Applications will be reviewed by ANA's Board Co-Chairs* and ANA's Director based on the following criteria:

- The organization's income is less than \$10,000 per year.
- The organization's dues are current, or have been waived for the current year.
- A representative for the organization has participated in at least one ANA meeting within the previous year.
- The organization has demonstrated a commitment to participating in and contributing to the on-going work of ANA.
- The organization's participation on conference calls will add to the diversity of experience within ANA.

Conference Call Subsidy Process:

Conference Call Subsidy Request Application forms are available from ANA's Seattle Office and should be submitted to that office as well. Applicants will be notified of the decision on their application within 10 working days of its submission. Arrangements will be made through the Seattle office concerning coverage or reimbursement of conference call costs.

1. Participation in conference calls will be subsidized for only one ANA working group or task force.
2. The organization's ANA contact, or another person designated by the organization, will be the authorized conference call participant.
3. An organization will be subsidized for one year. A request can be made for consideration of a second year's subsidy, but it will not be extended beyond two years.

ANA suggests its member organizations budget approximately \$300 per year for each issue working group or task force they wish to participate in. ANA will review on a

yearly basis its own budget projections to determine how much money to grant each year. ANA reserves the right to halt subsidies if financial problems arise.

* If a Board Co-Chair's organization is making a subsidy request, another Board member will be selected to review the application.

ANA Conference Call Subsidy Application Form

IMPORTANT:

Please read the Conference Call Subsidy Policy carefully before filling out this form

Applicant Group:

Contact Person for Applicant Group:

Group's Mailing Address:

ph:

fax:

e-mail:

Please address why your organization is asking for financial support to participate in conference calls.

If ANA was unable to grant you financial assistance, would you be able to secure funds from another source?

How does your organization's participation on conference calls advance ANA's diversity goals?

Has your organization received a conference call subsidy from ANA before? Yes or No.
If so, when?

Which one of ANA's working groups or task forces will you participate in?

Who will be the designated participant on conference calls?

