Fact Sheets on Nuclear Weapons Complex Sites – Written & Published by ANA Member Groups
Fact Sheet on SRS and Westinghouse and Nuclear Weapons – Savannah River Site Watch, August 6, 2021
NUCLEAR PLANT DECOMMISSIONING – A New Crisis and New Opportunity for States
A Beyond Nuclear Fact Sheet, December 2020
Plutonium Pit Production Fact Sheet – Nuclear Watch New Mexico, May 5 2020
Recent Press Releases & Updates
ANA Media Advisory: What to Look For in the U.S. Department of Energy’s FY2021 Nuclear Weapons and Cleanup Budget Request (February 6, 2020)
ANA Letter to Congress: Opposing $20 Billion increase in NNSA Budget (February 4, 2020)
Press Release: Communities Push Back Against Reports of Huge Nuclear Weapons Budget Increase (February 4, 2020)
2019 Reports and Fact Sheets
Weapons and Policy Fact Sheet (May 2019)
Cleanup and Waste Fact Sheet (May 2019)
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (November 2018)
Accountability Audit (May 2017)
Trillion Dollar Trainwreck (April 2016)
The Growing U.S. Nuclear Threat (May 2015)
Billion Dollar Boondoggles: Challenging the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plan to Spend More Money for Less Security (May 2014)
Recent Policy Recommendations
ANA Policy Recommendations (April 2016)
Life Extension Programs
Life Extension Programs (LEPs) are programs that seek to make adjustments to current nuclear weapons to meet military and political objectives. The United States has ~ 7,700 nuclear weapons and, instead of dismantling aging nuclear warheads, Congress appropriates significant funding to LEPs to extend their operational use. As a current example, The B61 Gravity Bomb LEP seeks more than $10 billion (up from an original cost of $4 billion) to extend the life of these aging weapons. In addition, the LEP would add a new tail-kit that would modify the weapon into a guided bomb. The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (ANA) is against these programs:
- The B61 LEP is of questionable military efficacy
- Updating/Upgrading aging nuclear weapons undercuts nonproliferation efforts (FAS Report, Slide 10)
- The B61’s mission may be voided by growing European opposition to nuclear weapons
- Cost overruns for the B61 LEP are emblematic of NNSA’s poor contract management and waste resources needed for other priorities: economic competitiveness, health-care, and education.
The B61 LEP is not the only LEP being considered. If we fail to stop this LEP, even more billions may be appropriated to other unnecessary and dangerous LEPs.
Defenders of LEPs argue that the objective of the programs are solely to extend the lifetime of nuclear weapons and do not add new military capabilities. Their contention is that these programs are relatively inexpensive compared to the rest of the Pentagon Budget and are necessary to maintain a reliable and verifiable deterrent. They also argue that if the United States does not update their aging nuclear weapons, it would send a message, to countries like North Korea, that the Untied States is not committed to its nuclear umbrella / protecting its allies.
Mixed Oxide Nuclear Fuel Facility
Mixed Oxide Plutonium Fuel (MOX) is composed of uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide powders which are mixed inside of fuel pellets. Because plutonium releases more radioactivity than uranium, this mixed fuel is more difficult to control inside of reactors and requires more safeguards than traditional uranium reactor fuel. In 2008 MOX fuel rods being tested by Duke Energy started warping and Duke withdrew from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s testing agreement.
The additional risks posed by MOX plutonium fuel, along with renewed global skepticism about nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, have resulted in the world-wide decline of the MOX industry. Japan has cancelled all of its orders for MOX plutonium fuel and the UK has recently closed its MOX plant in Sellafield due to a lack of customers. With no willing customers, the Department of Energy is pressuring the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to use MOX plutonium fuel. Some of the reactors that TVA is considering for MOX have the same Mark I exploding design that failed in Fukushima.
The US MOX program results from the 1998 Agreement on the Management and Disposition of Plutonium with Russia. This agreement designates 54 metric tons of surplus weapons grade plutonium for “immobilization” through irradiation as MOX fuel. Most of this plutonium comes from dismantled warheads. Although MOX is funded as anonproliferation program, it actually increases proliferation risks in two ways:
- By transporting dangerous plutonium oxide powder from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico where the US is currently processing its weapons plutonium to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina where MOX fuel assemblies will be manufactured.
- Encouraging commercial markets for plutonium as reactor fuel.
Today, the Russians have changed their minds about what they will do with their MOX fuel and plan to use it in “breeder reactors” which actually generate more plutonium – hardly a nonproliferation advance. Adding salt to this wounded program is its cost; ballooning from an original estimate of $1.6 billion to $9.7 billion today.