Nuclear Waste storage is a multi-generational challenge
The waste that comes as a byproduct of our nuclear weapons complex and nuclear reactors will impact thousands of generations. We have no storage and disposition plan that can tackle a problem of that scope so we currently look at methods that will allow us to mitigate the risks and costs associated with this growing challenge. The need for consent by those affected becomes essential to avoid the dumping of this hazardous waste on populations that are disempowered. In addition, we urgently need an interim waste management plan that will allow the Federal Government the time it needs to consider a more enduring solution.
Yucca Mountain poses risks beyond Nevada communities
When Nevada lacked clout in Congress, a plan was made for the nation’s nuclear waste to be shipped to a proposed centralized storage site in Yucca Mountain. Beyond geological concerns with the plan, local communities in Nevada near Yucca Mountain have protested the decision to move this waste into their backyard. Yucca Mountain also poses risks beyond Nevada communities. Because of its distance from the vast majority of nuclear waste in the country (which is mostly east of the Mississippi), the transportation routes for this hazardous material would impact a wide swath of the United States. While rail accidents are rare, low probability events occur over time and the risk posed from the transport of this material should concern many Americans.
Hardened Dry Cask Storage offers an interim solution
While the debate over waste management continues, nuclear waste is currently being stockpiled at a number of different sites and on-site at nuclear reactors. Left is an image of dry casks that, if hardened from attack, could offer a realistic interim solution that limits the movement of this hazardous material. While this will not eliminate the risk associated with nuclear waste, hardened on-site storage (HOSS) represents a practical solution that can be implemented far quicker and with less far-reaching problems as any proposed centralized waste facility would engender.
Reprocessing is not a responsible waste management plan
Reprocessing refers to the chemical separation of fissionable uranium and plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), formerly the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aims to accelerate the development and deployment of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies while providing greater disincentives to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. GNEP was initiated by the USA early in 2006, but picked up on concerns and proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. The vision was for a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities all under IAEA control or at least supervision. (Source: World Nuclear Association)
Although the Department of Energy (DOE) has not provided a life-cycle cost estimate for GNEP, the National Academy of Sciences estimated in 1996 that a reprocessing project like GNEP could cost more than $500 billion. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office has stated that “Reprocessing of U.S. spent fuel would cost 25 percent more than plans for direct disposal” in a permanent repository. Under the current plan for GNEP, the taxpayer and rate-payers, not the nuclear power industry, would bear this cost.
Reprocessing has already failed in the United States: West Valley, New York is the site of the only commercial reprocessing plant that operated in the United States. From 1966 to 1972, West Valley ran at 18% capacity and accumulated 600,000 gallons of high-level waste onsite. The cleanup of West Valley will cost more than $5 billion.
France has demonstrated that reprocessing does not solve the nuclear waste problem. According to the recent report Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France, issued by the International Panel on Fissile Material, “there is no clear advantage for the reprocessing option either in terms of waste volumes or repository area.” French reprocessing has left large quantities of solid waste contaminated with plutonium that will need to be stored in a repository.
Separating plutonium under GNEP would increase the production and stockpiles of nuclear weapons usable materials. Spent fuel that has not been reprocessed is considered “self protecting” because it is highly radioactive. Separated plutonium is a fine powder, and approximately 18 lbs. are required to make a bomb. The International Atomic Energy Agency already allows for a 3% margin of error in accounting for plutonium in existing reprocessing facilities. All of this increases the risk that material could be lost or diverted by terrorists. In addition, since the announcement of GNEP, several countries that do not currently reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium have expressed interest in developing the dangerous technologies, and could thereby acquire the ability to produce nuclear weapons-usable material for nuclear weapons.